G.R. No. L-49375 February 28, 1979
LEOPOLDO SALCEDO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE FILEMON H. MENDOZA and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Leopoldo Salcedo was charged with homicide through reckless imprudence. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. The trial was postponed twice at the instance of the prosecution. On the third scheduled trial date, March 28, 1978, no prosecuting fiscal appeared. A private prosecutor moved for another postponement, which the trial court denied. Salcedo, through counsel, then moved for the dismissal of the case, invoking his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Respondent Judge Mendoza granted the motion and dismissed the case.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. A second motion for reconsideration was filed. The court ordered both parties to submit pleadings, but they failed to comply. Subsequently, on May 8, 1978, respondent Judge issued an order setting aside his earlier order of dismissal and setting the case for trial again. Salcedo moved for reconsideration, arguing that reinstatement would place him in double jeopardy, but his motion was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the reinstatement of the criminal case after its dismissal based on the accused’s right to a speedy trial violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

RULING

Yes, the reinstatement constitutes double jeopardy. The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the May 8, 1978 order as null and void. The legal logic is firmly established in jurisprudence. A dismissal of a criminal case predicated specifically on the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial, even if granted upon the motion of the accused himself, is equivalent to an acquittal on the merits. This principle creates a recognized exception to the general rule under the Rules of Court that a dismissal upon the motion of the accused does not bar a subsequent prosecution.
The Court reasoned that when the respondent Judge initially dismissed the case on March 28, 1978, it was a direct response to the prosecution’s failure to proceed after multiple postponements and was expressly based on Salcedo’s invocation of his right to a speedy trial. Consequently, that dismissal operated as an acquittal. An order of acquittal becomes final immediately and cannot be recalled or reconsidered. Therefore, the respondent Judge’s subsequent order of May 8, 1978, which set aside the dismissal and revived the case, unlawfully placed Salcedo in second jeopardy for the same offense. The Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, as any further prosecution was constitutionally barred. The Solicitor General correctly concurred with this position.