G.R. No. L-67766 and G.R. No. 70881, August 14, 1985
Isidro T. Hildawa, et al. vs. Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, et al.

FACTS

Petitioners Isidro T. Hildawa and Ricardo C. Valmonte filed separate petitions consolidated by the Supreme Court, seeking to declare null and void the alleged executive or administrative order creating and fielding “secret marshals” or “crimebusters.” They alleged these special police teams were operating with an absolute license to kill suspected criminals like thieves and holduppers, thereby violating constitutional guarantees to due process, equal protection, presumption of innocence, rights of the accused, and the prohibition against cruel punishment. Petitioners argued such operations usurped judicial power by acting as judge and executioner.
Respondents, including the Minister of Defense and police officials, denied the existence of any specific order authorizing secret marshals to shoot or kill. They asserted the formation of special operation teams was a legitimate police response to a surge in crimes against public conveyance passengers and that these officers were subject to the same laws governing all peace officers, enjoying no special immunity. Notably, petitioners admitted they had not seen or read any such official order authorizing the alleged license to kill.

ISSUE

Whether the formation and deployment of special police operation teams, per se, are unconstitutional, and whether the alleged practice of granting these teams a “license to kill” violates fundamental constitutional rights.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions but issued a strong admonition. The Court held that the creation and deployment of special police teams to combat criminality are not, by themselves, unconstitutional. It is a basic and legitimate function of law enforcement to organize specialized units to address specific crime waves, similar to forming anti-vice or anti-narcotics squads. The constitutionality of such formations hinges on their methods of operation.
The Court unequivocally ruled that any alleged or actual practice of granting these teams a “license to kill” is utterly unconstitutional and cannot be tolerated in a democratic society governed by the rule of law. Such a practice constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental right to due process, which mandates that no person shall be deprived of life without being heard in a competent court, proceeded against under orderly legal processes, and afforded an opportunity to defend himself. The state cannot sanction summary executions. When a life is taken, the burden falls on the assailant, even if a law enforcer, to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified, such as in lawful self-defense. The Court, aligning with public statements from officials and religious groups cited in the decision, condemned the transformation of law enforcers into prosecutors, judges, and executioners. It directed respondents to exercise strict supervision and control over these teams to prevent any unlawful use of force, emphasizing that violence has no place in a civilized legal order.