G.R. No. L-49891 October 31, 1983
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Irineo V. Mendoza, as Presiding Judge of Branch III, Court of First Instance of Masbate, The Land Registration Commissioner, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Robert Arevalo filed an application for registration of title over six parcels of land. The Solicitor General entered his appearance, explicitly stating that while the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate was authorized to appear, the Solicitor General retained supervision and control. The notice specified that only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on the Solicitor General would bind the Government. The trial court rendered a decision confirming Arevalo’s title. A copy of this decision was received by the Provincial Fiscal on September 8, 1978, but he did not furnish a copy to the Solicitor General. The Solicitor General himself received a copy only on November 6, 1978. Relying on the fiscal’s earlier receipt, Arevalo moved for and was granted the issuance of a decree, arguing the decision had become final. The Republic, through the Solicitor General, filed a notice of appeal on December 5, 1978. The respondent judge dismissed the appeal as filed out of time, counting the 30-day period from the fiscal’s receipt of the decision.

ISSUE

Whether the thirty-day period to appeal should be counted from the service of the decision upon the Provincial Fiscal or from the time it was received by the Solicitor General.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner Republic. The appeal period must be counted from the date the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision. The Court applied its ruling in Republic v. Polo, which held that service on a fiscal does not automatically operate as service on the Solicitor General when the latter’s notice of appearance explicitly reserves that only service on his office will bind the Government. This is distinct from the factual setting in Republic v. Director of Lands, where the fiscal had broader authority. Here, the Solicitor General’s notice clearly retained control over actions compromising the Government’s interest, including the decision to appeal. Consequently, the period of appeal began to run only from November 6, 1978, making the December 5, 1978 notice of appeal timely. The trial court’s order dismissing the appeal was reversed and set aside. The Court directed the certification of the appeal and ordered the cancellation of the prematurely issued decree of registration and certificate of title.