G.R. No. L-4827 May 31, 1979
GERARDO D. ABE-ABE, et al., petitioners, vs. JUDGE LUIS D. MANTA of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin and PEDRO P. ROMUALDO, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioners, a group of 137 farmers and landowners from Camiguin, filed an injunction suit in the Court of First Instance against respondent Pedro P. Romualdo. They alleged prior vested rights under Article 504 of the Civil Code to use the water of certain creeks for irrigating their upstream ricelands, claiming use since 1938 and improvements made with government assistance. They sought to enjoin Romualdo from using the water at night for his downstream farm, arguing it was prejudicial to them. Romualdo countered that a rotation agreement had been reached, granting him nocturnal use, and that he had secured a temporary water permit from the Bureau of Public Works as required by Presidential Decree No. 424. He asserted the petitioners had filed no such permits and contended the court lacked jurisdiction, as the dispute fell under the exclusive original competence of the National Water Resources Council.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute over water rights for irrigation, or whether the petitioners were required to first exhaust administrative remedies before the National Water Resources Council.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction. The legal logic is anchored on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. Presidential Decree No. 1067, the Water Code of the Philippines, which took effect prior to the final proceedings, vested the National Water Resources Council with the original and exclusive authority to “determine, adjudicate and grant water rights.” The Code expressly repealed Article 504 of the Civil Code and other laws on water appropriation and acquisitive prescription, establishing a comprehensive regulatory system. The Court emphasized that the settlement of such technical water rights disputes is more expeditiously and competently handled by the specialized administrative agency. By filing directly in court, the petitioners bypassed this mandatory pre-administrative sifting process. Consequently, their action was premature and they had no cause of action yet for judicial review. The proper recourse was to first lodge their complaint with the Council, whose decision could then be appealed to the Court of First Instance under the Code’s provisions. The petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.