G.R. No. L-35707 May 31, 1979
CRISPINO FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. G. JESUS B. RUIZ, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cagayan, PROVINCIAL WARDEN of Cagayan and LEONARDO MANDAC, represented by his Heirs, thru the Widow DOLORES VDA. DE MANDAC, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Crispino Flores was found guilty of indirect contempt by the respondent Judge and ordered arrested and detained. The contempt charge stemmed from his refusal to vacate a parcel of land that had been levied upon and sold at public auction on November 28, 1968, to satisfy a judgment award in favor of Leonardo Mandac in Civil Case No. 1616. After the redemption period lapsed, the court ordered Flores to surrender possession to Mandac’s heirs. For his refusal, a motion for contempt was filed, leading to the contested order.
Flores filed this petition for certiorari and/or habeas corpus, challenging the legality of the contempt proceedings. He contends he was denied due process because he was not assisted by counsel during the hearing on the motion for contempt, nor was he duly furnished a copy of the motion or properly arraigned. He further argues that his mere refusal to vacate the levied property does not, in itself, constitute contempt of court.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) Whether petitioner was denied due process in the contempt proceedings for lack of assistance of counsel; and (2) Whether his act of refusing to surrender possession of property sold on execution constitutes indirect contempt.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the contempt order. On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge failed to satisfy the constitutional right to counsel. Contempt proceedings partake of a criminal nature, where the right to counsel is so fundamental that it cannot be waived unless the waiver is unequivocal and with full understanding. The record showed that when petitioner’s counsel failed to appear, the judge merely asked if he was willing to proceed without a lawyer. This fell short of the court’s duty to assign a counsel de oficio if the respondent is poor or to grant a reasonable time to procure one. This failure constituted a denial of due process which rendered the proceedings void.
On the substantive issue, the Court ruled that the act of refusing to vacate property subject of an execution does not, by itself, constitute contempt. The proper remedy for the prevailing party is to seek a writ of execution addressed to the sheriff, who is duty-bound to oust the defeated party and place the winner in possession. Mere unwillingness or refusal to relinquish the property is not contemptuous. The Court cited precedents, including Goyena de Quizon v. PNB and Rom v. Cobadora, which established that contempt is not the sanction for such refusal; the sheriff must enforce the writ through appropriate physical means if necessary. Given these dispositive grounds, the Court found it unnecessary to resolve the ancillary issue regarding the authority of counsel to file the motion for contempt.