G.R. No. L-31008. January 30, 1971.
Restituto Binabay, petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines and the Honorable Herminio C. Mariano, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Restituto Binabay was charged with serious illegal detention under an information dated June 28, 1969, which was amended on July 3, 1969. During the hearing on August 27, 1969, after discussions between counsel and the court regarding a potential plea to a lesser offense, petitioner was rearraigned. The Branch Clerk noted the accused entered a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, though it was unspecified. Respondent Judge then orally pronounced petitioner guilty under Article 267 in relation to Article 268(3) of the Revised Penal Code and imposed an indeterminate sentence. However, while reducing the judgment to writing, the judge discovered a critical procedural error: petitioner had been rearraigned under the superseded original information of June 28, not the operative amended information of July 3.
Consequently, on the same day, respondent Judge issued an order declaring the entire August 27 proceedings null and void and set the case for rearraignment under the amended information. Petitioner was rearraigned on September 9, 1969, where he pleaded not guilty. Before his trial could commence, petitioner filed this original action for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to restrain further proceedings. He argued that the oral judgment of August 27 had become final and that any new trial would place him in double jeopardy, claiming he had begun serving the sentence immediately after its pronouncement.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the August 27, 1969 proceedings null and void and in setting the case for rearraignment, thereby violating petitioner’s right against double jeopardy.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that no double jeopardy attached. The legal logic is clear and sequential. First, the Court found petitioner’s claim that he began serving his sentence was factually baseless. He remained a detention prisoner from June 28, 1969; no order of commitment was issued following the oral pronouncement, so service of the sentence could not have commenced. Second, and decisively, the proceedings of August 27 were inherently void from inception. The amended information of July 3 had superseded the original; therefore, the original information was legally non-existent at the time of the rearraignment. A rearraignment under a void information is itself a nullity, and no valid judgment can be based upon it. The judge’s subsequent order declaring the proceedings null and void was a correction of a patent error, not a violation of due process.
Furthermore, the Court held that by pleading not guilty during the proper rearraignment on September 9, 1969, petitioner waived all objections available in a motion to quash, including the defense of former jeopardy, as expressly provided under the Rules of Court. Since the initial proceedings were a legal nullity, there was no first jeopardy to begin with. The respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion but instead acted correctly to rectify a procedural error and ensure a trial based on the valid amended information. The temporary restraining order was dissolved.