GR L 25953; (August, 1979) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-25953 August 27, 1979
VICENTE FORTICH, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and ARTEX DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Vicente Fortich was employed by private respondent Artex Development Co., Inc. as Chief Mechanical Engineer and Plant Superintendent. After five months of service, his employment was terminated. Fortich filed a case before the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), contending that his dismissal was an unfair labor practice. He alleged that his termination had “no other cause than his active participation in the formation of the Artex Technical Union” and his union membership. The private respondent company, however, defended the dismissal by asserting that Fortich was hired only on a temporary or probationary basis without a fixed tenure, and thus his employment could be terminated at the employer’s pleasure.
The CIR, after evaluating the evidence, made key factual findings. It concluded that Fortich was indeed employed on a trial or temporary capacity. The court noted that his initial three-month probationary period was extended for another two months due to the company’s nascent operations and the testing of new machinery. The CIR found that even Fortich himself was uncertain about attaining permanent status and knew there was no definite term for his employment. Based on these circumstances, the CIR ruled that his employment was temporary and could be validly terminated by the employer.
ISSUE
The core issues were: (1) Whether petitioner Fortich was a permanent employee entitled to security of tenure, or a temporary/probationary employee whose services could be terminated at the employer’s pleasure; and (2) Whether his dismissal constituted an unfair labor practice due to his union activities.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. The ruling was anchored on the established doctrine that factual findings of the CIR, when supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Court meticulously reviewed the CIR’s factual conclusions and found no reason to overturn them.
On the first issue, the Court upheld the CIR’s finding that Fortich was a temporary employee. The evidence substantiated that his employment was on a trial basis, an arrangement not altered by the two-month extension. This factual determination, being supported by substantial evidence, was deemed final. The Court cited a line of jurisprudence, including Pambusco Employees Union v. CIR and National Labor Union v. CIR, reiterating the policy of non-interference with the CIR’s factual findings.
On the second issue, the Court also sustained the CIR’s rejection of the unfair labor practice charge. The CIR found the claim that dismissal was due to union activities unfounded. It noted that the union Fortich helped organize, the Artex Technical Union, had a mixed membership of supervisors and rank-and-file workers, which was potentially problematic under the Industrial Peace Act ( Republic Act No. 875 ). Management’s expressed disapproval of this mixed union, based on its perceived illegality, did not by itself constitute an unfair labor practice warranting the union’s dissolution or penalizing the employer. The Court, citing Genconsu Free Workers Union v. Inciong, affirmed that the CIR’s factual finding absolving the employer of anti-union discrimination must stand. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
