G.R. No. L-31429 January 31, 1972
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSCOE DABAN y GANZON, defendant-appellant, SIXTO P. DEMAISIP, respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Atty. Sixto P. Demaisip was initially counsel de parte for appellant Roscoe Daban, who was sentenced to death. He filed thirteen successive motions for extension of time to file the appellant’s brief, all of which were granted by the Supreme Court. Subsequently, citing the appellant’s father’s inability to pay for printing, Demaisip moved to be appointed as counsel de oficio to file a typewritten brief, claiming he had already prepared a draft. The Court appointed him as counsel de oficio but required a mimeographed brief. Despite this appointment, Demaisip filed four more motions for extension, bringing the total to seventeen granted extensions. No brief was ever filed.
The Court then required Demaisip to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. In his explanation, he argued that the appeal had become useless and abandoned because the appellant had escaped from prison. He based this on a notice from the Bureau of Prisons dated June 23, 1971, stating the escape occurred on June 15, 1971.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Atty. Sixto P. Demaisip should be held liable for his failure to file the required appellant’s brief.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court found respondent Atty. Demaisip liable for gross negligence and suspended him from the practice of law. The legal logic is clear and multi-faceted. First, the duty of a lawyer, whether serving as compensated counsel or as court-appointed counsel de oficio, is sacred and must be discharged with zeal and competence. The lack of financial remuneration does not diminish this duty; in fact, it heightens the responsibility to serve the cause of justice, especially for an indigent defendant facing a death penalty.
Second, Demaisip’s proffered explanation was legally untenable and demonstrated a careless disregard for both facts and law. Factually, he had assured the Court he had a draft brief ready as early as May 1971, before the appellant’s escape in June. His failure to file it during the thirteen extensions prior to the escape negated his excuse. Legally, his claim that the escape automatically abandoned the appeal betrayed ignorance of the Rules of Court. Under Section 9, Rule 122, the Supreme Court is mandated to automatically review all death penalty cases, regardless of an appellant’s escape. The judgment of the trial court in a capital case is not final until reviewed by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the appeal was neither useless nor abandoned, and his duty to file a brief remained imperative.
His conduct constituted an inexcusable neglect of a professional duty, which unnecessarily clogged the court’s docket and jeopardized the administration of justice. The Court imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law, effective immediately, though he was given a final twenty-day period solely to file the required brief for the appellant.