G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner, vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

An information for estafa was filed against Mario Fl. Crespo. Prior to arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer, citing a pending petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. The trial judge denied this motion. The Court of Appeals later restrained the judge from proceeding with the arraignment pending the Department of Justice (DOJ) review. Subsequently, the Undersecretary of Justice reversed the Provincial Fiscal’s resolution and directed the fiscal to move for the dismissal of the case. Complying, the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of evidence, attaching the DOJ directive.
The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss. He reasoned that granting it would require him to resolve the accused’s innocence based on evidence presented not before the court but before the Undersecretary of Justice. He held this would disregard due process and erode judicial independence and integrity. The judge then set the case for arraignment. The Court of Appeals initially dismissed the accused’s subsequent petition, leading to this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether a trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the prosecuting fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice and insist on proceeding to arraignment and trial.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case. The Court emphasized that the prosecution of crimes is solely under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed or dismissed lies with the executive branch, specifically the prosecuting officers, subject to the Secretary of Justice’s power of control and supervision. This discretion is based on their assessment of the evidence’s sufficiency to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
While the trial court has the inherent power to control its proceedings and is not a mere rubber stamp of the prosecution, its authority is not absolute. The court cannot compel the fiscal to prosecute a case when, after a review, the fiscal is convinced the evidence does not warrant a conviction. To deny the motion to dismiss and force the prosecution to present evidence it has already deemed insufficient would be a grave abuse of discretion. It would result in a futile and unnecessary trial, wasting the court’s time and resources. The judge’s duty is to evaluate the prosecution’s motion based on its merits and the fiscal’s valid exercise of discretion, not to substitute his own judgment for that of the prosecuting arm of the government on the matter of evidentiary sufficiency for filing the case.