G.R. No. L-72126, January 29, 1988
Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Philippine Pipes & Merchandising Corporation

FACTS

In 1975, respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation applied for a permit to fence its land in Meycauayan, Bulacan, for use in storing heavy equipment and finished products. That same year, the Municipal Council passed a resolution manifesting its intent to expropriate a portion of the respondent’s land for use as a public road. The Provincial Board of Bulacan, upon a special committee’s recommendation, disapproved this resolution in 1976, finding no genuine necessity for the expropriation. The respondent then reiterated its permit application.
In 1983, the Municipal Council, under a new mayor, passed a new resolution to expropriate the same land. This time, the Provincial Board approved it. The petitioner municipality subsequently filed a complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court, which issued a writ of possession and declared the taking lawful. The respondent appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the expropriation complaint on the ground that there was no genuine necessity for the taking of the respondent’s property for public use.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court emphasized that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law, not re-examining factual findings, absent any of the established exceptions. The petitioner failed to demonstrate that the appellate court’s conclusions fell under exceptions such as being grounded on speculation, manifestly mistaken, or constituting grave abuse of discretion.
The Court found the appellate court’s decision supported by substantial evidence. It upheld the finding that no genuine necessity existed to expropriate the respondent’s land for a public road, noting the availability of several other connecting roads and a more appropriate lot for the proposed purpose. The petitioner’s allegation that factual circumstances had changed over time was unsupported by concrete evidence. The power of eminent domain requires a genuine public necessity. While the legislature or delegated authority designates the property, courts retain the power to inquire into the legality and necessity of the exercise. The government may not capriciously choose which property to take. Here, the absence of a demonstrated genuine public necessity justified the dismissal of the expropriation action.