GR 38975; (January, 1980) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-38975. January 17, 1980.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch VII, and PAQUITO YUPO, respondents.
FACTS
The prosecution filed an information for murder against private respondent Paquito Yupo. During trial, the prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca, a police officer before whom Yupo had given a written statement and a waiver of his rights during a custodial interrogation on July 18, 1973. When the fiscal sought to question Roca on the incriminating contents of this statement, defense counsel objected on the ground that the statement was inadmissible, as it was taken without Yupo being assisted by counsel, in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Respondent Judge sustained the objection, ruling the confession inadmissible for being unconstitutional. He further held that the right to counsel during custodial interrogation was not susceptible to waiver. The prosecution moved for reconsideration, arguing that Yupo had validly waived his rights, but the judge remained firm. The prosecution thus filed this certiorari petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the judge for prematurely excluding the evidence and erroneously holding that the right could not be waived.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the objection to questions on the accused’s extrajudicial confession and in ruling that the constitutional right to counsel during custodial interrogation cannot be waived.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The Court clarified that the right to counsel during custodial interrogation may indeed be waived, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, as established in Miranda v. Arizona. However, the burden lies with the prosecution to demonstrate a valid waiver.
In this case, the prosecution failed to discharge this burden. The alleged waiver was not shown to have been given freely and voluntarily. The interrogation was perfunctory, and a critical circumstance militated against a finding of an intelligent waiver: private respondent, a nineteen-year-old native of Samar, was interrogated extensively in Tagalog, with no showing that he sufficiently understood the language to comprehend the full import of the rights he was supposedly waiving. Given these deficiencies, respondent Judge’s exclusion of the confession was justified. His ruling, aimed at enforcing the constitutional mandate to protect the accused from coercive interrogations, was not arbitrary or capricious. While the Judge’s statement that the right is non-waivable was legally inaccurate, his ultimate action of sustaining the objection was correct based on the invalid waiver presented. Thus, certiorari did not lie.
