G.R. No. L-51552 February 28, 1980
ASUNCION RAMOS, petitioner, vs. THE HON. AGUSTIN C. BAGASAO, ETC., ELENA MENDOZA AND THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ELISEO B. RIGOR, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Asuncion Ramos filed a civil case to annul a transfer certificate of title. Her attorney of record was Alfonso G. Espinosa. The respondent judge decided the case against Ramos. The decision was served personally on Ramos herself on March 19, 1979. The deputy clerk of court justified this direct service by stating that Atty. Espinosa had died before the decision’s promulgation, and his death was publicly known within local legal circles. Ramos subsequently engaged new counsel, Atty. Raymundo Z. Annang.
On April 17, 1979, Atty. Annang filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied by the respondent judge in an order received on July 26, 1979. On July 31, 1979, Ramos filed a notice of appeal, cash appeal bond, and a motion for extension to file a record on appeal. The respondent judge denied these filings on the same day, ruling they were filed out of time. The judge reckoned the 30-day appeal period from the personal service of the decision on Ramos on March 19, 1979.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge correctly denied the petitioner’s notice of appeal and related motions as having been filed out of time.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the respondent judge to give due course to the appeal. The legal logic proceeded on two alternative grounds. First, the Court found merit in the petitioner’s contention that the 30-day appeal period should not be counted from the personal service on her on March 19, 1979. Under Rule 13, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, when a party is represented by counsel, notices and court processes must be served on said counsel, not on the party, unless the court orders otherwise. The service on Ramos was ineffectual because she had an attorney of record at the time, and no court order authorized service directly upon her. The respondent judge’s reliance on Riego vs. Riego was misplaced, as that case involved service on the party by direct order of the court, which was absent here.
Second, and decisively, the Court ruled that even assuming arguendo that the appeal period began on March 19, 1979, the resulting four-day delay in filing the notice of appeal and motion for extension should be excused on equitable grounds. The Court emphasized that the record on appeal was already before the respondent judge, and a strict application of procedural rules would defeat substantial justice under the circumstances. Thus, the appeal should be allowed to proceed.