GR 37406; (August, 1976) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-37406 August 31, 1976
VALERIO TACAS, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE FLORENTINO C. CARIASO, Presiding Judge, CFI-Ilocos Sur, Branch V, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Valerio Tacas was charged with Less Serious Physical Injuries for hacking and stabbing Emiterio Ibaan on December 15, 1972. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to thirty days of arresto menor, and fully served his sentence. Subsequently, on April 17, 1973, the same Chief of Police filed a second criminal complaint against Tacas arising from the identical act, this time for Assault Upon a Person in Authority, alleging Ibaan was the incumbent barrio captain. Tacas objected on the ground of double jeopardy, but the respondent Judge denied the motion, ruling that the second prosecution could proceed. Hence, Tacas filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether the subsequent prosecution for Assault Upon a Person in Authority is barred by the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, given the petitioner’s prior conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries based on the same act.
RULING
Yes, the subsequent prosecution is barred. The legal logic is anchored on the constitutional and statutory rules governing double jeopardy. Under the Rules of Court, a conviction or acquittal bars a second prosecution not only for the identical offense charged but also for any offense which is necessarily included in or necessarily includes the offense charged in the first complaint. Here, the act committed—the single assault on Ibaan—constituted a complex crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries and Assault Upon a Person in Authority. The first complaint, however, only charged the former. Critically, the Court examined the second complaint and found it deficient in alleging a vital element of assault upon a person in authority: that the assault was committed while Ibaan was engaged in the performance of official duties. The body of the second complaint merely reiterated the allegations of the first, essentially charging the same offense of Less Serious Physical Injuries, albeit with a different designation. Therefore, the second complaint was merely a repetition of the first. Since Tacas had already been convicted and punished for that offense, putting him on trial again for the same act violates the principle of non bis in idem. The ruling in People v. Bonotan is directly controlling, establishing that conviction for one component of a complex crime arising from a single act bars prosecution for the other component or the complex crime itself. The petition was granted, and the respondent Judge was prohibited from further proceeding with the second case.
