G.R. No. L-11664; March 16, 1961
AMBROSIO GABIO, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. RODOLFO GANZON, ET AL., respondent-appellees.

FACTS

Petitioners Ambrosio Gabio, Igmedio Mesa, and Teopista Palma were members of the Iloilo City Police Force holding a series of temporary appointments. Gabio was first appointed in December 1945, Mesa in November 1945, and Palma in September 1946. Each received multiple reappointments, with most containing a notation that the appointment was authorized under Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code, allowing them to continue “until replaced by an eligible” but not beyond thirty days from receipt of a certification of eligibles. On January 6, 1956, City Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon summarily dismissed them from their positions, asserting that their temporary status authorized such dismissal.
The petitioners contended that they had acquired permanent civil service status and eligibility under Republic Act No. 186. They argued that this law, which grants eligibility to government employees with at least ten years of continuous service, applied to them as they had eventually completed over ten years of service by the time of their dismissal in 1956. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissed their petition, ruling that their appointments remained temporary and that the Mayor had the authority to dismiss them.

ISSUE

Whether petitioners, as temporary employees who completed ten years of continuous service after the enactment of Republic Act No. 186, are entitled to its benefits, thereby acquiring permanent civil service status and protection from summary dismissal.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling that the petitioners did not acquire permanent status and were validly dismissed. The Court’s legal logic centered on the interpretation of Republic Act No. 186. The Act’s Section 1 explicitly granted eligibility only to teachers who had already rendered ten successive years of continuous service “to the present time,” meaning up to the law’s effectivity on June 21, 1947. Although Section 2 extended benefits to other government officials and employees, the Court construed it consistently with Section 1’s clear temporal limitation. The legislative history, particularly the Senate amendments and Conference Committee report, indicated the intent to benefit only those who had already completed the ten-year service requirement by the time the law took effect.
This interpretation was bolstered by Administrative Order No. 41, issued to implement the Act, which required applicants to have rendered ten years of service on or before June 21, 1947. Since petitioners Gabio, Mesa, and Palma began their service in 1945 and 1946, they had not completed ten years by the law’s effectivity date. Consequently, they could not claim eligibility under RA 186. Their subsequent appointments remained temporary, as they were never extended permanent appointments. As mere temporary employees without civil service eligibility, their services were terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authority, Mayor Ganzon. The dismissal was therefore lawful.