GR L 17377; (April, 1961) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-17377; April 29, 1961
FRANCISCO LAGUNILLA, petitioner, vs. HON. JUAN O. REYES, Judge of the Court of First Instance, San Fernando, La Union; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF LA UNION and FERMIN MOTAS, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Francisco Lagunilla was convicted of slight physical injuries by the Justice of the Peace Court of Bangar, La Union, and fined. He appealed to the Court of First Instance. After his arraignment and plea of not guilty on July 7, 1960, the assistant provincial fiscal moved for postponement because the complainant and witnesses were absent. The fiscal informed the court that the complainant had appeared at his office the previous day and was informed of the trial. The accused moved for dismissal. The court waited until 10:30 AM, but the complainant and witnesses still failed to appear. The court then issued an order dismissing the case, citing the “apparent lack of interest on the part of the complainant to further prosecute.”
Subsequently, on July 11, 1960, the fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging the complainant might have been confused about the hearing date despite the prior notice. The accused opposed, arguing the dismissal was an acquittal and its reconsideration would place him in double jeopardy. Nevertheless, the trial court, on July 26, 1960, granted the motion, set aside the dismissal, and reset the case for trial. Lagunilla then filed this petition for certiorari with prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering its order of dismissal and reinstating the criminal case.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the July 26, 1960 order and reinstating the dismissal. The legal logic is anchored on the constitutional right to a speedy trial and the principle of double jeopardy. The dismissal order of July 7, 1960 was issued after the accused had pleaded not guilty and upon his motion, prompted by the prosecution’s unpreparedness to proceed due to the absence of its witnesses despite notice. Following established precedents like Gandicela vs. Lutero and People vs. Diaz, such a dismissal, when made unconditionally and without the express consent of the accused, and predicated on the prosecution’s failure to prosecute despite opportunity, is equivalent to an acquittal on the merits.
An acquittal, once promulgated, becomes immediately final and cannot be recalled for reconsideration, as held in People vs. Sison. Therefore, the trial court’s act of reconsidering the dismissal and reinstating the case was a grave abuse of discretion, as it effectively placed the accused in second jeopardy for the same offense. The fiscal’s motion for reconsideration, filed after the acquittal had become final, could not validly revive the case. The order of dismissal stands as a bar to further prosecution.