G.R. No. L-44640, L-44684, L-44714. October 12, 1976.
PABLO C. SANIDAD, et al., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.

FACTS

These consolidated petitions challenged the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which called for a national referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976, to submit proposed constitutional amendments to the people. The petitioners, including journalists and citizens, argued that President Ferdinand E. Marcos, exercising legislative powers under martial law, lacked the authority to propose amendments to the 1973 Constitution. They contended that the power to propose amendments was vested solely in the interim National Assembly under the Transitory Provisions of that Constitution. The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, defended the President’s actions as a legitimate response to the people’s expressed will through barangay resolutions and as a necessary exercise of power during the transition period.

ISSUE

The core issues were: (1) whether the question of the constitutionality of the presidential decrees was a political question beyond judicial review; (2) whether the President possessed the power to propose constitutional amendments and call a plebiscite during the transition period under martial law; and (3) whether the submission to the people was proper.

RULING

The Supreme Court, in a decision with extensive concurring and dissenting opinions, dismissed the petitions and upheld the validity of the presidential decrees. On the first issue, the Court, through the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Castro, firmly held the matter was justiciable, not political. It abandoned the old doctrine of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito and affirmed that the judicial review extends to determining whether a constitutional organ has acted within the limits of its authority, as established in Gonzales v. COMELEC and Javellana v. Executive Secretary. The question involved the legality, not the wisdom, of the President’s acts.
On the principal issue of presidential power, the Court ruled that the President could validly propose the amendments. The legal logic centered on the unique circumstances of the transition period under the 1973 Constitution and Proclamation No. 1081 (martial law). The interim National Assembly, though vested with the amendment power under Article XVII, had not been convened, and the people, in a 1973 referendum, had rejected its convening for at least seven years. This created a vacuum. The Court reasoned that sovereignty resides in the people, and all government authority emanates from them. The President, in proposing the amendments, was not exercising his legislative power under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution in a vacuum. Instead, he was acting as an instrument to effect the will of the people, as allegedly expressed through barangay resolutions, to amend the Constitution through an alternative mode—a national plebiscite—when the primary mechanism (the interim Assembly) was inoperative by popular choice. The Court found the period for consideration and the mechanics for the plebiscite to be sufficient and proper, thereby sustaining the acts challenged.