G.R. No. L-15877. April 28, 1961.
JOVENAL R. FERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TAN TIONG TICK, ET AL., defendants. TAN TIONG TICK, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Plaintiff Jovenal R. Fernandez owned thirty long tons of scrap iron, salvaged from Sangley Point and stored at a yard in Manila. Defendant Tan Tiong Tick filed a replevin suit against Tan Tay Cuan (Civil Case No. 35804) to recover scrap iron he claimed was his. Pursuant to a court order, the Sheriff seized the scrap iron at the yard, which included Fernandez’s property. Fernandez filed a third-party claim, but because Tan Tiong Tick posted an indemnity bond, the scrap iron was not returned. Fernandez subsequently sued for damages. The trial court, after hearing, rendered judgment ordering Tan Tiong Tick to pay Fernandez P1,400.00 for the value of the scrap, plus P2,000.00 in compensatory damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.
After judgment, Tan Tiong Tick filed a petition to set aside the judgment and reopen the case. He argued his former counsel was negligent for resting the defense case abruptly during trial without his consent, which he equated to an unauthorized confession of judgment, and that his own failure to inquire about the case status was excusable negligence. He also claimed to have a meritorious defense proving the seized scrap was his. The trial court denied his petition.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s petition to set aside the judgment and reopen the case based on alleged counsel negligence and excusable negligence.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial. On the first legal question, the act of counsel in resting the case after the court denied a postponement and offered alternatives did not constitute a confession of judgment. A confession of judgment is a voluntary submission by a party or counsel, explicitly authorized, to the opponent’s claim. Counsel’s decision here was a tactical choice made in open court under the circumstances, not an admission of liability or waiver of defenses. The appellant’s claim of unauthorized confession was unfounded.
On the second question, the alleged negligence was not excusable. A client is bound by the actions of counsel in procedural matters during trial. The appellant’s failure to maintain contact with his counsel to monitor the case’s progress did not meet the standard of care an ordinary prudent person bestows upon important business. Furthermore, and decisively, the petition to set aside the judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was fatally defective. It was not accompanied by the required affidavits of merit showing the facts constituting the alleged excusable negligence and the facts of a substantial defense. The absence of these affidavits is jurisdictional; the court is not called upon to entertain such a petition. Consequently, the trial court correctly denied the petition for relief. The direct appeal, limited to these legal questions, thus failed.