GR L 15958; (May, 1961) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-15958. May 31, 1961.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LEON RAMOS, FRANCISCA DE RAMOS, AVELINA RAMOS and one “INTSIK RAMOS,” defendants-appellees.
FACTS
The defendants were initially charged in the Justice of the Peace Court with the crime of slight physical injuries. The information alleged that they conspired to attack, assault, and inflict physical injuries upon Aurora Padilla. Subsequently, a separate complaint for grave slander by deed was filed against the same defendants in the Court of First Instance. This second information contained additional material allegations, specifically that the defendants uttered the defamatory words “Heto ang iyo, puta ka, malandi ka” at the offended party and then proceeded to attack, box, assault, and slap her.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for grave slander by deed. It reasoned that the defamatory words were already in existence at the time of the filing of the first complaint for slight physical injuries. Applying the rule against double jeopardy, the court held that the accused could have been charged with the more serious offense (grave slander by deed, which necessarily includes slight physical injuries) in the first instance. It cited People vs. Carmen to support the view that an accused should be shielded from several prosecutions arising from a single act.
ISSUE
Whether the dismissal of the complaint for grave slander by deed on the ground of double jeopardy is correct.
RULING
No. The order of dismissal is set aside. The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy protects an individual from being twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, not merely for the same act. A comparison of the two informations reveals that they charge two distinct offenses arising from two different acts.
The first case for slight physical injuries imputes the act of inflicting physical injuries. The second case for grave slander by deed imputes the act of insulting the offended party by uttering defamatory words, which culminated in an assault. The act of insulting (an offense against honor) is entirely different and distinct from the act of inflicting physical injuries (an offense against persons). They constitute separate crimes. The fact that these two acts may have proceeded from the same criminal impulse, occurred on the same occasion, or that one preceded the other, does not merge them into a single offense. The cited case of People vs. Carmen is inapplicable as it involves several offenses arising from a single act. Here, there are two different acts resulting in two different offenses. Consequently, prosecuting the defendants for grave slander by deed after their prosecution for slight physical injuries does not place them in double jeopardy. The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.