G.R. No. L-14810. May 31, 1961.
LAZARO BOOC, petitioner-appellant, vs. SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., as City Mayor, VICENTE P. MANCAO, assistant City Engineer, FELIPE B. PAREJA, as City Treasurer, RESTITUTO CANTOS, as City Auditor and THE CITY OF CEBU, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Lazaro Booc, employed in various capacities by the Cebu City Engineer’s Office since 1947, was dismissed from his position as General Bridge Foreman on August 27, 1956, by Mayor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. for alleged dishonesty and serious misconduct. The dismissal was based on an investigation report concerning accusations that Booc solicited wage cuts from subordinates. Booc filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking reinstatement and back wages. He argued his dismissal was unlawful, being without cause and a proper hearing, and that as an employee in the unclassified civil service, only the Secretary of Public Works and Communications or the Commissioner of Civil Service could dismiss him.
The respondents countered that Booc’s employment was temporary, as evidenced by his last appointment covering a specific period and subject to termination at the discretion of the City Engineer, particularly due to the project-based and fund-dependent nature of his job. The trial court dismissed Booc’s petition, upholding the respondents’ position. Booc’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner, Lazaro Booc, was lawfully dismissed from his employment and is entitled to reinstatement via a writ of mandamus.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, denying the petition for mandamus. The legal logic rests on two primary grounds. First, Booc failed to exhaust administrative remedies. His appointment letter indicated he could appeal his dismissal to the proper department head, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, as provided under Section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 58 . By not pursuing this appeal, Booc prematurely resorted to judicial action, violating the settled doctrine that administrative remedies must be exhausted before seeking court intervention.
Second, and fundamentally, Booc’s employment status was temporary, not permanent. His last appointment was explicitly for a fixed period (July 1 to September 30, 1956) for a specific project, “Maintenance of National roads and City Streets,” funded by a limited appropriation. The appointment contained a clear notation that employment would cease automatically at the period’s end and was subject to lay-off at the City Engineer’s discretion. The financial records showed a dwindling project balance, underscoring the temporary and contingent nature of the position. Consequently, Booc did not enjoy the statutory protection against removal afforded to permanent civil service employees. His dismissal, effected by the Mayor and implemented by the City Engineer, was within the discretionary authority governing temporary appointments and did not constitute an unlawful removal.