GR L 15811; (June, 1961) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-15811. June 30, 1961.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME. JUAN MANUEL, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS
Petitioner Juan Manuel, along with his children, filed a petition to change their surnames from “Manuel” to “Eaton.” Juan claimed that John Eaton was his natural father. In a decision dated March 27, 1961, the Supreme Court denied the petitions. The Court found that John Eaton had not acknowledged Juan as his natural child. Consequently, under Article 366 of the New Civil Code, Juan was not permitted to use his alleged father’s surname. Since the petitions of Juan’s children were derivative of his own, they were also denied.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. They argued that under the ruling in Valencia v. Rodriguez, an unacknowledged natural child could use the natural father’s surname. They also contended that the Republic, as oppositor-appellant, failed to specifically assign as error in its brief the lower court’s grant of Juan’s petition, implying such issue was not properly before the Supreme Court for review.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court correctly denied the motion for reconsideration, thereby affirming the denial of the petitions for change of name.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration, affirming its original decision. The legal logic is twofold. First, the petitioners’ reliance on Valencia v. Rodriguez was misplaced. That case was decided prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code, a period with no specific statutory provision governing the use of surnames by illegitimate children. The present case is governed by Article 366 of the New Civil Code, which explicitly provides that a natural child shall use the father’s surname only if acknowledged by both parents. If acknowledged by only one parent, the child uses that parent’s surname. The records contained no proof that John Eaton had acknowledged Juan. Furthermore, unlike in Valencia where the father acquiesced to the use of his surname, here, Juan admitted he had always used “Manuel” and only sought to adopt “Eaton” in 1958 after his alleged father’s death.
Second, the Court properly addressed the substantive issue concerning Juan’s petition despite the Republic’s procedural omission. Under Section 5, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court may consider plain errors unassigned in the briefs. The granting of Juan’s petition was a fundamental legal error apparent on the record, as it contravened the mandatory provision of Article 366. Therefore, the Court was duty-bound to correct it. The motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
