GR L 18755; (August, 1961) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-18755. August 31, 1961.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the ACTING DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE ANGEL MOJICA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and MARCIAL AMA y PEREZ, respondents.
FACTS
This case originated from a petition for certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines and the Acting Director of Prisons. The underlying criminal case involved Marcial Ama y Perez, whose death penalty imposed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal was affirmed by the Supreme Court on April 29, 1961. Following the return of the records, the trial court, presided over by respondent Judge Angel Mojica, scheduled the execution for August 4, 1961.
However, on August 3, 1961, upon motion of the counsel de oficio, Judge Mojica issued an order suspending the August 4 execution and reset it for September 4, 1961. The Acting Director of Prisons filed a motion for reconsideration on August 11, arguing that under the Constitution, only the President of the Philippines holds the power to suspend the execution of a death sentence. The respondent judge denied this motion on August 18, 1961, despite having been informed that the President had already granted a reprieve for the convict, which was to last until September 3, 1961.
ISSUE
Whether the petition for certiorari, which assails the respondent judge’s order suspending the execution, has been rendered moot and academic.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as moot. The legal logic is straightforward: the core controversy became academic due to subsequent events. The Court noted that the presidential reprieve granted to the convict was set to expire on September 3, 1961. Consequently, after that date, the authorities would be free to carry out the execution pursuant to the respondent judge’s own rescheduled order of August 3, which set the new date for September 4, 1961. Since the execution was no longer impeded by the judge’s contested order—as the President’s reprieve, a superior constitutional act, would have lapsed—the legal issue lost its practical significance. Courts generally do not adjudicate moot cases, as their resolution would have no actual legal effect. Therefore, the petition was dismissed for being moot, with costs.
