G.R. No. 238468 . July 06, 2022
PERLITA MABALO, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF ROMAN BABUYO, REPRESENTED BY VIRGILIO L. BABUYO, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

The case involves a parcel of land owned by the late Roman Babuyo. Upon his death, his children (respondent heirs) took possession of the undivided property. Later, they discovered another heir, Rufino Babuyo, whose daughter, Segundina, claimed an inheritance share. Segundina sold a 364-square-meter portion of this claimed share to petitioner Perlita Mabalo on June 2, 2014.
The following day, Mabalo entered the property, ordered laborers hired by the heirs to stop trimming a tree, and subsequently constructed a fence with a “No Trespassing” sign. She also caused the demolition of two houses and pruned plants on the lot. The heirs demanded she vacate, and upon her refusal, filed a complaint for forcible entry against her.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower courts’ rulings that held Mabalo liable for forcible entry and ordered her to vacate the property and pay rentals.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. The core legal logic rests on the nature of co-ownership and the specific elements of forcible entry. The land remained an undivided estate of Roman Babuyo; thus, all his heirs, including Segundina (and by extension, her buyer Mabalo), were merely co-owners. A co-owner only holds abstract, ideal shares in the entire property, not any specific physical portion. Consequently, the sale to Mabalo transferred only Segundina’s pro indiviso share, not a right to possess a specific, delineated area of the land.
For forcible entry to prosper, the plaintiff must prove prior physical possession and that they were deprived of that possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. The respondent heirs successfully established prior physical possession as they had been in possession since Roman’s death, introducing improvements and exercising acts of ownership. Mabalo’s acts of constructing a fence, posting a sign, and demolishing structures constituted the “force” necessary for the suit, as these were calculated acts intended to exclude the co-owners from the property. Her claim of acting as an owner was invalid because, as a mere co-owner, she could not unilaterally take exclusive possession of a specific portion without the consent of the other co-owners or a court-ordered partition. Her entry was therefore unlawful, warranting her ejectment and liability for reasonable compensation for her use of the property in the form of rentals.