G.R. No. L-35101 November 24, 1972
DANILO BUSTAMANTE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE MAXIMO MACEREN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Danilo Bustamante was charged with murder. Upon arraignment on December 14, 1970, he pleaded guilty. The trial court, finding the presence of incomplete self-defense and three ordinary mitigating circumstances, rendered judgment convicting him and sentencing him to one year of imprisonment. A commitment order was issued on the same day, and Bustamante was immediately confined and began serving his sentence. Three days later, the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion for modification of the penalty. In response, Bustamante’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty. On December 21, 1970, Judge Jorge Coquia granted the motion to withdraw the plea, set aside the judgment of conviction, and ordered a new trial. The case was subsequently reassigned to respondent Judge Maximo Maceren, who, after a new trial, convicted Bustamante of homicide and imposed a heavier indeterminate penalty.

ISSUE

Whether the order of Judge Coquia setting aside the original judgment of conviction and ordering a new trial, after the petitioner had begun serving his sentence, placed the petitioner in double jeopardy.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, nullified the subsequent orders and decision, and ordered the petitioner’s release. The constitutional right against double jeopardy attaches when the following conditions concur: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) the accused is convicted, acquitted, or the case is dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. All these conditions were present in this case. A judgment of conviction had been validly rendered, and the petitioner had not only waived his right to appeal but had also commenced serving the sentence imposed. The execution of the sentence had begun with his confinement. The Court, citing People v. Tacneng, emphasized that once a sentence has been partially executed, the court loses jurisdiction to alter, modify, or set aside the judgment. The subsequent motions filed by the fiscal and the defense did not divest the court of its loss of jurisdiction. The act of Judge Coquia in reopening the case and setting aside the executed judgment was a grave jurisdictional error, as it subjected the petitioner to a second jeopardy for the same offense. Consequently, the subsequent proceedings before Judge Maceren were null and void. The petitioner, having fully served the valid one-year sentence, was ordered released.