GR L 14957; (October,1961) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-14957; October 19, 1961
CO KE TONG, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent-appellee.
FACTS
Petitioner Co Ke Tong was convicted of estafa by the Court of First Instance of Manila for misappropriating P42,400.00 received from Choa Bei to purchase petrolatum. The information alleged he received the money under an obligation to deliver the goods or return the amount, but instead converted it to his personal use. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and he began serving his sentence on February 5, 1956.
On February 15, 1958, Co Ke Tong filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-13471), contending the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the information failed to allege the essential elements of “deceit” or “misrepresentation” and “intent to gain.” The Supreme Court dismissed that petition for lack of merit via a minute resolution dated February 18, 1958, and denied his motion for reconsideration. Undeterred, he filed a second, substantively identical petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Rizal on September 9, 1958, which was also dismissed. He now appeals that dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance of Rizal correctly dismissed the second petition for habeas corpus.
RULING
Yes, the dismissal was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the second habeas corpus petition was barred. The legal logic is grounded on the doctrine of res judicata and the finality of Supreme Court resolutions. The issue raised in the instant appeal—that the information was defective for omitting allegations of deceit and intent to gain, thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdiction—is substantially identical to the issue already presented and definitively resolved in G.R. No. L-13471. In that prior proceeding, the Supreme Court exercised its jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
A minute resolution of dismissal by the Supreme Court constitutes a final adjudication on the merits. To allow a second habeas corpus petition re-litigating the same jurisdictional challenge would, in effect, permit a review or revocation of a final order from a superior court, undermining judicial finality and stability. The Court of First Instance of Rizal therefore properly dismissed the petition to prevent such an impermissible collateral attack. The Supreme Court, in this appeal, simply invoked its prior resolution, making further lengthy discussion unnecessary.