G.R. No. L-75349 October 13, 1986
ROSALINA BUAN, RODOLFO TOLENTINO, TOMAS MERCADO, CECILIA MORALES, LIZA OCAMPO, Quiapo Church Vendors, for themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves, petitioners, vs. OFFICER-IN-CHARGE GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioners, licensed vendors around Quiapo Church, filed a special civil action for prohibition with this Court on August 5, 1986. They sought to perpetually prohibit respondent Manila Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr. from arbitrarily revoking their business permits and from threatening the physical demolition of their stalls. They alleged the revocation, effected via a notice dated May 3, 1986, was without cause and violated due process, as Section 171(n) of the Local Government Code allowed cancellation only for violations of law or permit conditions, which they denied committing. The Court issued a temporary restraining order on the same day.
It was subsequently revealed that a substantially identical action, a “prohibition with preliminary injunction” (Civil Case No. 86-36563), had been filed earlier on July 7, 1986, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the “Samahang Kapatiran Sa Hanapbuhay Ng Bagong Lipunan, Inc.” The president and press relations officer of this Samahan were petitioners Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo, respectively, and the other petitioners herein were also members. This RTC case was based on the same facts—the May 3, 1986 notice of permit cancellation—and sought the same relief against the same respondent.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for prohibition should be granted.

RULING

No, the petition is denied. The Supreme Court dismissed the case primarily on the ground of lis pendens or auter action pendant (pendency of another action). The requisites for this ground are present: there is identity of parties (or parties representing the same interests, as petitioners here are members/leaders of the Samahan that filed the RTC case), identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for (injunction against permit cancellation and demolition), and identity of facts upon which the relief is founded (the May 3, 1986 revocation notice). A judgment in either case would constitute res adjudicata in the other. This conduct constitutes forum-shopping, a malpractice proscribed for trifling with court processes and degrading the administration of justice. Under prevailing rules, such violation warrants the summary dismissal of both petitions.
Furthermore, the petition lacked merit on substantive grounds. As of the filing date, August 5, 1986, none of the petitioners possessed a valid and subsisting license or permit, as all had expired prior thereto, a fact confirmed by their own submitted receipts. Thus, they had no legal basis to assert a right to operate their stalls. Their claim that non-renewal equated to an illegal revocation was untenable. Finally, the action was rendered moot and academic as the acts sought to be prohibited had arguably been consummated—the permits had expired and the threatened demolition had reportedly occurred. The Court denied the petition and commanded the Regional Trial Court to dismiss its pending case.