G.R. No. L-18128 & L-18672, December 26, 1961
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. J. M. TUAZON & CO., ET AL.

FACTS

J.M. Tuason & Co. obtained final and executory judgments of ejectment against Bruna Rosete and Buenaventura Dizon from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The trial court subsequently issued orders for execution and demolition. Meanwhile, Republic Act No. 2616 , authorizing the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, was enacted. Its Section 4 provided that once expropriation proceedings are initiated, no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted against present occupants. To prevent the Land Tenure Administration from filing such expropriation, Tuason filed a prohibition case (Q-5527) challenging the law’s constitutionality and secured a preliminary injunction from Judge Caluag. Rosete and Dizon then moved to suspend the demolition orders, but Judge Yatco denied the suspension as no expropriation case had actually been filed.
Rosete and Dizon filed a certiorari petition with the Court of Appeals against Judges Yatco and Caluag, Tuason, and the Land Tenure Administration. They argued they were entitled to a stay under R.A. 2616 and that Judge Caluag abused his discretion in enjoining the expropriation. The Court of Appeals granted a preliminary injunction, which also dissolved Judge Caluag’s injunction, thereby allowing the expropriation to proceed. Tuason then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via certiorari, arguing the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and a preliminary injunction in this case. A secondary, substantive issue is whether Section 4 of R.A. 2616, which suspends ejectment proceedings upon the mere initiation of expropriation, is constitutional.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Tuason & Co. First, it held that the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals’ certiorari jurisdiction is limited to acts of inferior courts in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The orders subject to the petition—the demolition orders from an ejectment case and the injunction from a prohibition case involving constitutionality—were not appealable to the Court of Appeals. The demolition orders were part of the execution of a final judgment, and the prohibition case was directly appealable only to the Supreme Court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals had no authority to entertain the certiorari petition or issue the injunction, rendering its actions null and void.
On the constitutional issue, the Court declared Section 4 of R.A. 2616 unconstitutional. The provision, by automatically suspending all ejectment proceedings and sales upon the mere filing of an expropriation case, effectively deprived the landowner of the essential attributes of ownership—possession, enjoyment, and disposition—without simultaneous payment of just compensation. This constitutes a taking of property in violation of the Bill of Rights. The law did not provide for a deposit of the property’s value or current rentals during the pendency of expropriation, leaving the owner’s title an “empty shell.” The constitutional guarantee requires that just compensation be paid contemporaneously with the taking of proprietary rights. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals was set aside, and the trial court was directed to proceed with hearing the prohibition case (Q-5527) with dispatch.