G.R. No. 222259 . October 17, 2022.
LOWELLA YAP, PETITIONER, VS. ALMEDA YAP, HEARTY YAP-DYBONGCO AND DIOSDADO YAP, JR., RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

Petitioner Lowella Yap filed a Complaint for partition and accounting, claiming to be an acknowledged nonmarital child of the late Diosdado Yap, Sr. and thus an heir to his estate. She presented evidence including a birth certificate entry naming Diosdado Yap as her father, an affidavit from Diosdado, Sr. referring to her as his daughter, a special power of attorney, photographs, and family correspondence. Respondents Almeda Yap (the surviving spouse), Hearty Yap-Dybongco, and Diosdado Yap, Jr. (marital children) opposed the claim. They asserted that Lowella was not Diosdado Sr.’s child but was instead the daughter of Matilde Lusterio and her lawful husband, Bernardo Lumahang. To support this, they presented the marriage contract between Lusterio and Lumahang and the birth certificates of their other children. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Lowella, declaring her a nonmarital child and ordering partition. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, finding that Lowella failed to overcome the presumption of legitimacy as a child born to a married woman, and dismissed her complaint.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Lowella Yap failed to prove her filiation to Diosdado Yap, Sr. and is not entitled to inherit from his estate.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The legal logic centers on the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code. Lowella was born in 1961 to Matilde Lusterio, who was married to Bernardo Lumahang since 1953. Consequently, Lowella is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate child of Lumahang and Lusterio. To impugn this legitimacy and establish herself as the nonmarital child of Diosdado, Sr., Lowella must successfully invoke one of the grounds under Article 166 of the Family Code, such as proving the physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the period of conception. Lowella did not allege or prove any such ground. Her presented evidence—the affidavit, photographs, and the birth entry—while indicating a close relationship, is insufficient to overturn the strong presumption of legitimacy. The affidavit of recognition executed by Diosdado, Sr. is ineffective because a child born to a married woman cannot be acknowledged without first disproving the husband’s paternity. The birth certificate entry, though naming Diosdado Yap as the father, is a private document that does not constitute an authentic act of recognition and cannot prevail over the status of legitimacy conferred by her mother’s subsisting marriage. Therefore, Lowella failed to establish her filiation to Diosdado Yap, Sr. and has no right to inherit from his estate.