G.R. No. L-17760; October 31, 1962
RAMCAR, INC., petitioner, vs. EUSEBIO S. MILLAR, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Ramcar, Inc. operates an auto repair and body building shop on General Luna Street, Manila. Private respondents, residents living near the shop, filed an action to abate the establishment as a nuisance. The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. The appellate court declared the operation a public nuisance and a violation of Manila’s zonification ordinances, ordering its removal and awarding damages to the respondents. Ramcar, Inc. sought review by certiorari, arguing its business was a licensed garage permitted in a commercial zone and that the courts could not declare it a nuisance absent action by city authorities.
The business involves repairing and assembling vehicle bodies using tools and machinery that generate significant noise, often extending into night hours and weekends. At the time Ramcar transferred to this location, respondent Millar and his family already resided adjacent to the property. Residents had repeatedly petitioned city authorities for closure, but officials were conflicted over whether the area was zoned residential or commercial. The Court of Appeals found it was a commercial zone but held that a body building shop exceeded the activities permitted for a “garage” under the zoning ordinance.

ISSUE

The primary issues were: (1) whether Ramcar’s body building business constituted a public nuisance and violated Manila’s zoning ordinances; (2) whether the courts could declare a nuisance despite municipal inaction; and (3) whether the award of damages to the respondents was legally justified.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with modification. On the first issue, the Court upheld the finding that the business was a public nuisance due to its location. It agreed with the appellate court’s legal analysis that a “body building shop” is not encompassed within the term “garage” as permitted under the zoning ordinance. A garage designates a place for storing, repairing, and servicing vehicles, whereas body building involves assembling and rebuilding structures, which is a distinct and more intensive industrial activity. Thus, the operation violated the zoning law.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that the judicial power to determine and abate a nuisance exists independently of municipal action. While the city charter grants the municipal board authority to declare nuisances, its inaction does not deprive the courts of their inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate such matters in cases properly brought before them. The finding of nuisance by the Court of Appeals, being a question of fact, was conclusive.
Regarding damages, the Court found the award legally sound. Article 697 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that the abatement of a nuisance does not preclude recovery of damages for its past existence. The constant noise and annoyance caused to the residents justified the award of special damages and attorney’s fees. However, the Court modified the judgment by clarifying that the business was a nuisance per accidens (due to its location), not per se. Therefore, the permanent injunction was limited to prohibiting the body building operations at that site, without requiring the demolition of all existing structures, as they could potentially be used for lawful pursuits.