GR L 22160 61; (January, 1974) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. L-22160 & L-22161. January 21, 1974.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TEODORO TAMANI, accused-appellant.
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Teodoro Tamani, was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Isabela for the murder of Jose Siyang and the attempted murder of Mayor Eduardo Domingo. The crimes occurred on the night of June 11, 1953, in Angadanan, Isabela. Siyang was killed by four gunshot wounds, while Domingo sustained a through-and-through wound in his right palm. The trial court sentenced Tamani to life imprisonment for murder and an indeterminate penalty for attempted murder, with corresponding indemnities.
A preliminary procedural issue arose regarding the timeliness of Tamani’s appeal. The trial court’s decision was promulgated on February 14, 1963. His counsel filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1963, which was denied. Notice of this denial was served by registered mail on his counsel’s wife on July 13, 1963. The counsel claimed he only learned of the order on September 7, 1963, after his wife allegedly lost the notice. He filed a notice of appeal on September 10, 1963. The Solicitor General moved to dismiss the appeal as filed 58 days late, arguing strict compliance with the reglementary period is mandatory.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the appeal should be dismissed for being filed out of time. Subsidiarily, on the merits, the issue is whether the crimes were correctly qualified as murder and attempted murder.
RULING
The Court first addressed the procedural issue. Under Rule 122, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, an appeal must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation of the judgment or notice of the order appealed from. The period is interrupted by a motion for reconsideration but resumes upon notice of the order denying it. Applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis, “promulgation” refers to “judgment” and “notice” refers to “order.” Here, the period to appeal from the order denying the motion for reconsideration began upon notice to counsel. Even assuming the period started on July 13, 1963, the notice of appeal filed on September 10, 1963, was indisputably late. A strict application of the rules justifies dismissal.
However, the Court, considering the gravity of the penalties imposed (life imprisonment and a substantial prison term) and the fact that the delay was due to counsel’s inadvertence, opted to review the case on its merits to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice. This is an exceptional exercise of judicial discretion.
On the merits, the Court affirmed the convictions. The killing of Jose Siyang was correctly qualified as murder due to the presence of treachery (alevosia). The attack was sudden, from a distance, and against an unarmed and unsuspecting victim, ensuring the execution without risk to the assailant. Treachery is present even if there was a mistake in the victim’s identity. As to Mayor Domingo, the acts constituted attempted murder. The accused had the intent to kill and commenced execution by firing, but was unable to inflict a mortal wound because the mayor sought refuge. The two crimes were not a complex crime as they resulted from distinct volleys of gunfire. The penalty for murder, absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, is reclusion perpetua. The term “life imprisonment” was noted as improper. The appealed decision was affirmed.
