GR L 22763; (March, 1983) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-22763 March 18, 1983
BRUNA ARANAS DE BUYSER, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, IGNACIO TANDAYAG and CANDIDA DE TANDAYAG, defendants-appellees.
FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant Bruna Aranas de Buyser is the registered owner of Lot No. 4217, a cadastral lot bordering the Surigao Strait. Contiguous to this lot is a parcel of land formed by accretion from the sea. Defendants Ignacio Tandayag and his wife Candida have occupied this foreshore land under a Revocable Permit issued by the Director of Lands, paying an annual fee. The plaintiff filed an action to recover possession of this accreted land and collect rents, later amending the complaint to implead the Director of Lands for allegedly issuing the permit illegally. The trial court dismissed the complaint, declaring the land as part of the public domain and the Tandayags as its lawful occupants.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether the plaintiff-appellant, as the owner of the adjacent registered land, has acquired ownership over the alluvial formation along the seashore, or whether such land remains part of the public domain under the control of the state.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, ruling that the alluvial formation is part of the public domain. The legal logic is anchored on the principle that lands added to the shore by accretion from the sea form part of the public domain and are outside the commerce of man. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which provides that such lands may be declared the property of adjacent owners when no longer needed for public utility. The Court clarified that this provision does not confer automatic ownership; it requires an express government declaration that the land is no longer needed for public use, which was absent in this case.
Critically, the Court found that the Director of Lands’ approval of the defendants’ Revocable Permit did not constitute such a declaration. The permit explicitly stated the land might be needed for future public improvements like a boulevard and seawall, and the occupation was temporary and revocable. Since the land is property of public dominion, its disposition falls under the exclusive administration of the Bureau of Lands under the Public Land Act. The plaintiff failed to file any application with the Bureau for its use, whereas the defendants properly applied for and were granted a revocable permit. Consequently, the plaintiff had no legal right to the land meriting judicial protection. The state validly exercised its authority through the Bureau of Lands to grant temporary, revocable permits for the use of foreshore lands, as expressly allowed under Section 68 of the Public Land Act.