G.R. No. L-19517 November 30, 1962
Caridad Cabarroguis, petitioner, vs. Hon. Lourdes P. San Diego, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Caridad Cabarroguis was on trial for estafa. During the hearing, the prosecution presented its sole witness, complainant Emerita C. Orpilla. Based on the witness’s testimony that she agreed to lend money to the accused to be repaid in goods, the respondent Judge dictated in open court an order dismissing the case, stating the facts did not constitute estafa. Immediately after this verbal pronouncement, the prosecution moved for reconsideration, presenting a document to show the accused did not actually possess the goods, indicating fraudulent intent. Respondent Judge then set aside or “withdrawn” her verbal order of dismissal and allowed the prosecution to continue presenting evidence. The defense cross-examined the witness, and the prosecution rested its case.
The hearing was resumed a week later for the defense’s evidence. At this point, petitioner moved to set aside the order withdrawing the dismissal, arguing that placing her on trial again after the dismissal violated her right against double jeopardy. The respondent Judge denied the motion. Petitioner then filed this original action for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to nullify the withdrawal order and to stop further proceedings in the criminal case.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in withdrawing her verbal order of dismissal and continuing the trial, thereby placing the petitioner in double jeopardy.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that no double jeopardy attached. The legal logic is twofold. First, the verbal order of dismissal was incomplete and ineffective. Under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, a judgment (which includes an order of dismissal amounting to an acquittal) must be written and signed by the judge. The respondent Judge’s order was merely dictated orally; it was never reduced to writing or signed. Therefore, it was interlocutory and subject to recall before it became final. The cases cited by the petitioner involved written and signed orders of dismissal and are thus inapplicable.
Second, the petitioner waived any claim of double jeopardy. After the dismissal was withdrawn, the prosecution continued its direct examination of the witness, and the petitioner’s counsel proceeded to cross-examine without any objection. By actively participating in the trial and failing to raise a timely objection, the petitioner is deemed to have waived the constitutional safeguard. An objection based on double jeopardy was only raised a week later when the defense was to present its evidence, which was too late. The Court emphasized that the right against double jeopardy can be waived expressly or impliedly, and the petitioner’s conduct constituted an implied waiver. Consequently, the respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in continuing with the trial.