G.R. No. L-16772; November 30, 1962
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JULIAN MONTON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

The defendants-appellees were charged with libel before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The information alleged that they conspired to prepare and send a letter to President Ramon Magsaysay containing defamatory statements against Jose J. Monteclaro, the Second Assistant City Fiscal of Iloilo. The letter accused Monteclaro of using his official power and influence for personal and familial gain, including illegally obstructing an irrigation system and conniving with a local justice of the peace to harass the defendants with weak criminal cases. It was alleged these statements were false, malicious, and intended to expose Monteclaro to public hatred and dishonor.
The defendants filed a motion to quash the information. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. It ruled that the letter constituted a private communication made to the President in the performance of a legal, moral, or social duty, falling under the first exception of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, and therefore could not be considered libelous. The prosecution, through the Solicitor General, appealed this order of dismissal.

ISSUE

Whether the privileged character of a communication, as an exception under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, constitutes a valid legal ground for the quashal of an information for libel.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court clarified that the privileged character of a communication is not a proper ground for a motion to quash but is a matter of defense to be raised during trial. Article 354 establishes that every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious, but this presumption does not apply in certain exceptional cases, including a private communication made in the performance of a duty. This exception, however, merely removes the presumption of malice; it does not render the communication non-actionable per se.
The prosecution retains the right to prove actual malice, which is an element of the crime. The information in this case specifically alleged that the defendants acted “willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malicious intent.” In a motion to quash, these factual allegations are hypothetically admitted. Therefore, dismissing the case at the pleading stage improperly deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to present evidence to establish malice in fact, overcoming the privilege. The Court distinguished the cited case of U.S. vs. Bustos, where acquittal on the ground of privilege was decreed only after a full trial where the prosecution failed to prove malice. The order of dismissal was set aside.