G.R. No. L-16916. November 29, 1962.
FRANCISCO Q. DUQUE, HUGO S. ESTRADA, MARIA C. MAGSANO and RESTITUTO C. BASA, petitioners, vs. HON. AMADO S. SANTIAGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, EMETERIO M. CASTAÑEDA and CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, respondents.

FACTS

On July 18, 1959, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed an information for libel with damages against petitioners, based on a complaint by respondent Governor Conrado F. Estrella. The charge stemmed from a published article in the Pangasinan Courier, which allegedly contained defamatory statements. The petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the information, arguing that the published material constituted a fair and true report of a political acceptance speech and a fair comment on the official acts of a public official, thus qualifying as a privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. They also argued, in the alternative, for a bill of particulars and raised a counterclaim for damages.
The respondent Judge, in an order dated February 3, 1960, denied the motion to quash. The court ruled that the privileged character of a communication is a matter of defense to be raised during trial, not a ground for quashal. The court also denied the prayer for a bill of particulars and struck out the counterclaim. The judge set the case for arraignment. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, adding that the information was defective for charging more than one offense (libel and slander), but this was also denied.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the information for libel on the grounds that: (1) the publication was a privileged communication, and (2) the information charged more than one offense.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, finding no grave abuse of discretion by the trial court. On the first ground, the Court held that the determination of whether a publication is privileged and made without malice is a question of fact that must be resolved during a full trial on the merits. The privileged character of a communication merely removes the presumption of malice; it does not automatically negate criminal liability. The plaintiff retains the burden of proving actual malice, but this issue requires the presentation of evidence, which is not proper in a motion to quash. Citing precedent, the Court emphasized that such matters are evidentiary defenses.
On the second ground, the Court found that the information did not charge multiple offenses. The allegation that petitioners uttered the substance of the libelous article in public and private conversations before its publication was not a separate charge for slander. Instead, it was an allegation intended to establish the element of malice, which is integral to the single charge of libel. Therefore, the information was not duplicitous.
The Court further ruled that the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order not subject to appeal. Any error in the trial court’s assessment of the privileged nature of the communication or the structure of the information can be properly raised and reviewed on appeal after a final judgment. Since the respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction and discretion, no grave abuse warranting certiorari was present. The writ of preliminary injunction was dissolved.