G.R. No. L-13342; November 28, 1962
GO CHI GUN alias CHIPBUN GO CHECO, GO AWAY alias LIM KOC, and FEDERICO M. CHUA HIONG, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. GO CHO, GO TECSON, DONATO GO TIAK GIAP, CESAREO GO TEK HONG, ALFONSO GO TEK BIO, MARIANO GO TEK LIONG, DOMINGO GO TEK LUNG, GO GIOK YE, GO CHUN TE and PACIFICO YAP, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

In 1949, the Manila Court of First Instance, upon petition of plaintiffs-appellants Go Chi Gun, et al., appointed a receiver over properties of the deceased Go Checo. The plaintiffs claimed to be heirs entitled to a portion of these estates. The defendants opposed the receivership, but the Supreme Court, in a prior case ( G.R. No. 3937 ), upheld the lower court’s discretion in making the appointment. The main litigation involved plaintiffs’ attempt to annul a project of partition of Go Checo’s estate approved as early as 1916. The trial court initially ruled for the plaintiffs, but on appeal in G.R. No. L-5208, the Supreme Court reversed the decision “with costs against plaintiffs-appellees.”
Upon remand, the defendants submitted a bill of costs to the Clerk of Court, which included items for the receiver’s bond premium and the receiver’s compensation of P5,000. The Clerk approved these items. On plaintiffs’ opposition, the trial judge disallowed the bond premium but ruled on the receiver’s compensation. The judge ordered that the P5,000 compensation be charged partly to defendants (P1,000) and partly to plaintiffs (P4,000). Only the plaintiffs, who were held liable for the P4,000, appealed this order.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the compensation of the receiver should be taxed as costs against the defeated party (the plaintiffs) or be charged against the funds or properties under receivership.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the receiver’s compensation was properly apportioned as costs. The legal logic rests on the explicit provision of Section 8, Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, which grants the court authority to award the receiver reasonable compensation “to be taxed as costs against the defeated party, or apportioned, as justice requires.”
The Court reasoned that since the final judgment in the main case (G.R. No. L-5208) was rendered in favor of the defendants “with costs against plaintiffs,” the receiver’s compensation prima facie constituted a recoverable cost. The trial court, however, exercised its discretionary power under the Rule to apportion the fees. It found that the receivership had also benefited the defendants by preventing the foreclosure of mortgages on some properties. This finding justified charging a portion (P1,000) of the fees to them. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in this equitable apportionment.
The appellants cited American jurisprudence suggesting that a receiver’s compensation should be paid from the funds under receivership when the appointment was proper. The Court, however, ruled that such foreign decisions cannot override the clear and specific mandate of the Philippine Rules of Court. Therefore, the order was affirmed, with costs against the appellants.