G.R. No. L-37399 May 29, 1974
BENITO UY, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. MELECIO A. GENATO, Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, CITY OF OROQUIETA and CITY ENGINEER ARESIO CASING, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, owners of residential lots in Oroquieta City, filed a complaint on March 27, 1973, alleging that portions of their properties, previously reserved as “road-right-of-way,” were taken by the respondent City and its City Engineer for road widening. They asserted that this constituted a taking for public use without payment of just compensation or reimbursement for demolition expenses. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing lack of jurisdiction because the City acted pursuant to instructions from the Commissioner of Public Highways and the Regional Director, which were implementations of martial law proclamations.
Respondent Judge initially denied the motion to dismiss, mindful of a presidential decree mandating just compensation. However, upon reconsideration in an order dated June 21, 1973, he granted the dismissal. He ruled that the expropriation, being traceable to a presidential letter of instruction issued during martial law, placed the matter beyond judicial competence. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this certiorari petition.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, based solely on the premise that the taking was undertaken pursuant to martial law instructions.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of dismissal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The ruling is anchored on the fundamental constitutional principle that the power of eminent domain is inseparable from the obligation to pay just compensation. The Court emphasized that the respondent Judge committed a serious error in concluding that judicial authority was ousted simply because the city officials acted under instructions allegedly emanating from martial law proclamations.
The legal logic is clear and twofold. First, the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation is unequivocal and applies regardless of the source of the authority for the taking. Jurisprudence, such as Herrera v. Auditor General, Alfonso v. Pasay City, and Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, consistently upholds the right to compensation even when the government takes property without prior expropriation proceedings. Second, the presidential decree cited by the Judge himself explicitly requires compliance with this constitutional condition. The Court found no basis in the cited letter of instruction to infer that it intended to disregard or nullify the right to just compensation. The ratification of presidential acts under the Constitution did not legalize any potential violation of this specific constitutional command.
Therefore, the respondent Judge’s duty was to hear the case on its merits to determine the fact of taking and the corresponding compensation. His refusal to do so, based on an erroneous assumption of lost jurisdiction, constituted a denial of procedural due process and a deviation from his constitutional duty. The Court reiterated that an official’s mere invocation of acting under orders from higher authority does not abate judicial power to inquire into the legality of acts affecting constitutional rights.