G.R. No. L-28333. May 31, 1974.
Toribio P. Muncal, petitioner-appellant, vs. Hon. Alfin S. Vicencio, Judge of the City Court of Cabanatuan City, and Feliciana Vizcarra, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Feliciana Vizcarra filed an ejectment complaint against Toribio Muncal in the City Court of Cabanatuan City, which ruled in her favor. Muncal appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija. On August 31, 1965, CFI Judge Serafin Cuevas, motu proprio, dismissed the case “for failure to prosecute” without prejudice. Almost a year later, Vizcarra moved to remand the case to the city court for execution. Judge Cuevas granted the motion on August 18, 1966, clarifying that his prior order dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute, thereby reviving the city court’s judgment for execution under Rule 40, Section 9 of the Rules of Court.
The city court, upon remand, issued a writ of execution. Muncal moved to quash it, arguing the original dismissal terminated the entire case, leaving no judgment to execute, and that the August 18, 1966 clarifying order was issued after the dismissal order had become final. The city court denied his motion, stating it could not review the CFI’s order. Muncal then filed a petition for certiorari in the CFI to annul the writ, which was dismissed, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the City Court of Cabanatuan City acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of execution based on the CFI’s remand order.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Muncal’s petition, ruling the city court acted properly. The legal logic centers on jurisdiction and the finality of the CFI’s orders. The CFI’s August 18, 1966 order explicitly interpreted its prior dismissal as pertaining to the appeal for failure to prosecute. Under Rule 40, Section 9, such dismissal revives the inferior court’s judgment for execution. Muncal’s contention that the city court’s judgment was extinguished was incorrect; the CFI’s clarification was a proper interpretation of its own order within its jurisdiction.
Critically, the Supreme Court held that Muncal’s remedy was misdirected and untimely. If he believed the CFI’s August 18, 1966 order was an illegal modification of a final order, he should have directly challenged that CFI order through certiorari in the appellate courts at the time it was issued. By failing to do so and instead attacking the city court’s ministerial act of executing the remand order, he slept on his rights. The city court, as an inferior court, had no authority to review or disregard the lawful order of the superior CFI; its duty was purely ministerial to implement the remand for execution. To allow an inferior court to nullify a superior court’s directive would disrupt judicial hierarchy and the administration of justice. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion by the city court was found.