G.R. No. L-27760 May 29, 1974
CRISPIN ABELLANA and FRANCISCO ABELLANA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Judge, Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II; and GERONIMO CAMPANER, MARCELO LAMASON, MARIA GURREA, PACIENCIOSA FLORES and ESTELITA NEMEÑO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Francisco Abellana was prosecuted for physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the City Court of Ozamis City after his cargo truck hit a motorized pedicab, injuring private respondents. The city court convicted him and awarded damages. Francisco Abellana appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance (CFI). Subsequently, the private respondents, as offended parties, filed a separate civil action for damages in another branch of the CFI, presided by respondent Judge Geronimo R. Marave, impleading both Francisco Abellana and his alleged employer, Crispin Abellana.
The petitioners moved to dismiss this independent civil action, arguing that the offended parties failed to reserve their right to institute it separately when the criminal case was commenced in the city court, as purportedly required by Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. They contended that such a reservation could no longer be made at the appellate stage. Respondent Judge denied the motion, reasoning that since the appeal resulted in a trial de novo, vacating the city court’s judgment, the offended parties could still validly waive the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal case and reserve their right to file a separate action at the CFI level.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the independent civil action for damages, despite the offended parties’ failure to reserve the right to file it separately at the inception of the criminal case in the city court.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion and denied the petition for certiorari. The Court clarified that a literal reading of Rule 111, without considering the doctrine of trial de novo, is erroneous. Under Section 7 of Rule 123, an appealed case shall be tried de novo in the CFI as if originally instituted there. This vacates the inferior court’s judgment and restores the parties to their original positions. Consequently, the requirement for reservation under Rule 111 must be applied as if the criminal action were being instituted for the first time in the CFI.
The Court emphasized that the offended parties’ waiver and reservation made at the CFI level, before the trial de novo commenced, were timely and valid. To hold otherwise would not only ignore the explicit rule on trial de novo but could also infringe on substantive rights, as rules of procedure should not diminish, increase, or modify such rights. The petitioners’ interpretation was thus rejected for being contrary to established procedural principles and for potentially raising a constitutional issue regarding the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. The order of the respondent Judge was upheld as legally sound.