G.R. No. L-37606 July 15, 1974
Leonardo Avila, petitioner, vs. Honorable Auditor General, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Leonardo Avila, a Provincial Treasurer, was preventively suspended due to a criminal case for malversation of public funds. He was also found administratively guilty of gross negligence in a separate proceeding. The criminal case was eventually dismissed after twenty-one years, primarily because the principal prosecution witness, the Provincial Auditor, had died. Avila filed a petition with the Supreme Court on October 25, 1973, seeking payment of back salaries for the entire period of his suspension, arguing the dismissal of the criminal case entitled him to such compensation.
The Solicitor General commented, highlighting that the dismissal was not an acquittal and that an administrative finding of guilt existed. The Court denied Avila’s petition and subsequent motions for reconsideration for lack of merit. In his second and third motions for reconsideration, Avila shifted to procedural arguments, insisting he had a right to appeal directly to the Supreme Court from the Auditor General’s decision and questioning the Court’s use of a resolution to deny his petition.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether a provincial officer, preventively suspended and administratively found guilty, is entitled to back salaries after the dismissal of the related criminal case. The secondary procedural issues are: (1) whether a public official can appeal directly to the Supreme Court from a decision of the Auditor General, and (2) whether the Supreme Court can dismiss a petition via a minute resolution.

RULING

The Court denied the petition and all motions for reconsideration. On the substantive claim for back salaries, the ruling is grounded on the distinction between dismissal and acquittal. A dismissal of a criminal case, especially one due to the unavailability of a witness and not amounting to a vindication of innocence, does not automatically entitle a suspended employee to back salaries, particularly when there is a prior administrative finding of guilt for gross negligence. The preventive suspension was justified, and the subsequent dismissal did not erase the administrative culpability.
On the procedural issues, the Court clarified the proper appellate remedy. Citing Philnabank v. Auditor General and Buendia v. City of Baguio, it held that only a “private party or entity” may appeal directly to the Supreme Court from a ruling of the Auditor General under the governing 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 327 . As a provincial treasurer and a public official, Avila is not a private party; his correct appeal was to the President, whose decision would be final. His direct resort to the Supreme Court was therefore improper. Furthermore, the Court affirmed its authority to issue minute resolutions to summarily deny petitions, a practice recognized by the Rules of Court and the Constitution itself (Article X, Section 9). The third motion for reconsideration was thus denied with finality.