GR 78774; (April, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 78774 April 12, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINADOR SALCEDO y RUBI, DIOSCORO SALCEDO, JR. y RUBI, and OSCAR RABINO y DIMANARIG, accused-appellants.
FACTS
The accused-appellants were charged with the murder of Ignacia Quingquing. The prosecution’s case was built on circumstantial evidence, as no witness saw the actual infliction of the fatal wound. Witness Plaridel Manaog testified that on the night of March 26, 1981, he saw the three appellants dragging the bleeding victim from her house. He observed Dominador Salcedo armed with an “Indian arrow,” while his co-accused had bolos. The victim was heard pleading for mercy before she died. Her son, Angeles Quingquing, later found her body with an arrow embedded in her back and heard appellant Oscar Rabino threaten him. An autopsy confirmed a fatal punctured wound. The defense consisted of alibis, claiming they were elsewhere during the incident.
ISSUE
The primary issue was whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged. A secondary issue was the correct classification of the crime, specifically the presence of qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the crime from murder to homicide. The Court held that the totality of the circumstantial evidence met the legal standard for conviction. The proven circumstances—the appellants were seen dragging the bleeding victim, they were armed, the victim pleaded for mercy and died shortly after, her body was found with a fatal wound consistent with the weapon seen, and the subsequent threat to her son—were consistent with each other and pointed conclusively to the appellants’ guilt, while being inconsistent with innocence. Their alibis were correctly rejected for being weak and not physically impossible, as their claimed locations were within the same barangay as the crime scene.
However, the Court found that the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were not proven with the same degree of certainty as the crime itself. The evidence did not indubitably show the manner of attack to establish treachery, nor the planning and preparation for evident premeditation. Consequently, the crime was homicide, not murder. The alleged aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nocturnity were also not proven. There was no evidence that the appellants deliberately used their collective strength to facilitate the crime, nor that they purposely sought the cover of night. The appellants were thus sentenced to an indeterminate penalty for homicide and ordered to pay indemnity.