GR L 71909; (May, 1988) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-71909 May 24, 1988
JANE CUA, ROBERT C. CUA, NELSON C. CUA, BENY C. CUA AND EDDIE C. CUA, petitioners, vs. CARMEN LECAROS AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
FACTS
Joe Cua, petitioners’ predecessor, purchased a property in 1960 from J.M. Tuason & Co. At the time of purchase, a 1958 final decision in Civil Case No. Q-3296 already existed, ordering defendant Antonio Estabillo to vacate the land and remove his house. Despite a writ of execution and order of demolition, enforcement was repeatedly delayed. In 1962, Estabillo’s wife sold the house on the lot to respondent Carmen Lecaros. After the Supreme Court affirmed the 1958 decision in 1975, the trial court issued a writ of demolition in 1976. Its implementation was temporarily suspended due to government expropriation proceedings but was later lifted after the National Housing Authority certified the property was not part of a state program.
Lecaros, who had expanded her occupancy by renting out portions, filed an injunction case to stop the demolition, claiming she was a buyer in good faith. This was dismissed. After the sheriff delivered possession to Cua in 1981, Lecaros re-entered the property. Cua filed a complaint for damages and a restraining order. The trial court found Lecaros guilty of indirect contempt for violating the writ, as it bound Estabillo and all persons claiming under him. However, the Intermediate Appellate Court later sustained Lecaros’s right to remain, setting aside the trial court’s demolition orders.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent, as a successor-in-interest to the original defendant in a final ejectment case, can resist the execution of the judgment and the alias writ of demolition issued to enforce it.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulling the appellate court’s decision. The legal logic is anchored on the final and executory nature of the 1958 judgment in Civil Case No. Q-3296. A final judgment is binding not only on the parties but also on their successors-in-interest and privies. By purchasing the house from the wife of the original defendant, Estabillo, Lecaros stepped into his shoes and became a privy to the judgment. Consequently, she is bound by the order to vacate and remove structures from the land. Her claim of being a buyer in good faith is immaterial, as she acquired no better right than her predecessor, who had no valid title to transfer. The Court emphasized that execution of the long-overdue decision could no longer be unjustly delayed by successive legal maneuvers. The appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in obstructing the enforcement of a final judgment. The trial court’s orders for an alias writ of demolition were reinstated to finally settle the controversy and serve the ends of justice.
