GR L 67451; (May, 1988) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-67451 May 4, 1988
REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONDRAY FARMS, INC., petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. RIZALINA BONIFACIO VERA, as Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, MORRIS G. CARPO, QUEZON CITY DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING CORPORATION, and COMMISSIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION, respondents.
FACTS
This case involves a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Morris Carpo from a Supreme Court decision dated September 28, 1987. The underlying dispute concerns land registration proceedings (LRC Case No. 657). Carpo contends the Supreme Court’s decision deviated from the doctrine in Villegas v. Fernando, which held that failure to reconstitute destroyed judicial records under Act No. 3110 results in a waiver of the effects of a prior decision, necessitating the filing of a new registration action. Carpo also argues that appeal, not certiorari, was the proper remedy to dispute the lower court’s 1981 decision. The core factual issue is the effect of the alleged non-reconstitution of the records of LRC Case No. 657 and related appellate cases (TA-G.R. Nos. 209-211) after their destruction.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the failure to reconstitute the judicial records of the land registration case pursuant to Act No. 3110 results in the termination of the entire case, requiring the parties to start anew, or whether the proceedings can be continued from the last available authentic records.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration. The legal logic is clearly delineated. First, the Court held the Villegas doctrine, which relies on Ambat and Section 29 of Act No. 3110 , is inapplicable. That doctrine applies only where all records in both the trial and appellate courts were destroyed and not reconstituted. Here, the facts are distinct because authentic records of the case existed, including the CFI Decision, the Court of Appeals Decision, and the official report of the Supreme Court’s decision in Guico v. San Pedro, a related certiorari proceeding. Consequently, the applicable rule is from Nacua v. de Beltran, which states that when not all records are lost, the parties must merely return to the next preceding stage in the same case where records are available and continue therefrom.
Second, the Court addressed Carpo’s procedural argument. It ruled that the petition (G.R. No. 56471) was correctly treated as an appeal. While Rule 42 generally governs appeals from the CFI, Section 2 thereof was deemed amended by Republic Act No. 5440 . This law provides that petitions for certiorari to review such judgments shall be filed and served as petitions for review under Rule 45, which does not require a notice of appeal or record on appeal. Therefore, the mode adopted was proper. The Court concluded that LRC Case No. 657 was still pending as no decree of registration had been issued, and the heir of the original applicant properly continued the proceedings from the stage supported by authentic records, which was the final determination of ownership. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied with finality.