G.R. No. L-79094 June 22, 1988
MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Manolo P. Fule was convicted for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) by the Regional Trial Court, a conviction affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The conviction was based solely on a Stipulation of Facts entered into during the pre-trial conference. The stipulations established that Fule, as an agent of Towers Assurance Corporation, issued a check to Roy Nadera for a remittance of collection. The check was subsequently dishonored upon presentment because the account was already closed. The prosecution presented exhibits, and the defense waived the right to present evidence, submitting a memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts instead.
However, a critical procedural defect was present: the Stipulation of Facts was not signed by the accused, petitioner Manolo P. Fule, nor by his counsel. Despite this lack of signatures, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on this unsigned stipulation as the sole basis for conviction. Fule challenged the conviction, arguing that the unsigned stipulation was inadmissible as evidence against him.

ISSUE

Whether the unsigned Stipulation of Facts, entered into during pre-trial, is admissible as evidence to sustain a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court held that the Stipulation of Facts was inadmissible in evidence. The ruling was grounded on the mandatory character of Section 4, Rule 118 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which explicitly states: “No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel.”
The Court emphasized that the rule is mandatory. The use of the negative term “shall” and the specific requirement for the signatures of both the accused and counsel impose a strict duty of compliance. This interpretation is reinforced by the rule of statutory construction that negative words are mandatory and by the fundamental principle that penal statutes, including procedural rules in criminal cases, must be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. The defense counsel’s subsequent confirmation via memorandum could not cure the defect, as the rule unequivocally requires the signatures of both parties at the outset.
Consequently, without the admissible stipulation, the prosecution’s evidence was rendered insufficient. The prosecution should have presented independent evidence to establish the elements of the crime upon discovering the defect. The guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt based on admissible evidence. Therefore, to serve the ends of justice, the case was ordered reopened for the proper reception of evidence.