G.R. No. 85815 May 19, 1989
ELENO T. REGIDOR, JR., ANICETO T. SIETE, CAMILO B. ZAPATOS & RODULFO ENRIQUEZ, petitioners, vs. GOV. WILLIAM CHIONGBIAN, Vice Gov. FLORENCIO GARCIA, SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN, Members MARIVIC SAGRADO, MORPHEUS AGOT, CONSTANCIO BALAIS, ALEGRIA CARIÑO, ERNESTO IRA, PACITA YAP, JULIO TIU and SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD, ROBERT O. TACLOB, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioners are the duly elected city officials of Tangub City, Misamis Occidental, who were proclaimed and assumed office following the January 18, 1988 local elections. On November 3, 1988, the respondents, comprising the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, approved Resolution No. 340-88 recommending the petitioners’ suspension for failing to appear at a hearing on a misconduct complaint filed by respondent Robert O. Taclob. Pursuant to this, Governor William Chiongbian issued an Order of Preventive Suspension on November 24, 1988, suspending the petitioners for 60 days and simultaneously appointing Taclob, a member of the governor’s political faction, as Officer-in-Charge Mayor.
The petitioners filed this prohibition case, alleging the respondents acted without authority. They contended that under Section 63 of the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337), the power to preventively suspend a provincial or city official is vested solely in the Minister (now Secretary) of Local Government, not in a Provincial Governor. The Court issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of the suspension.

ISSUE

Whether the Provincial Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan have the authority to order the preventive suspension of elected city officials.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled they do not. The legal logic is anchored on the explicit statutory hierarchy established in Section 63 of the Local Government Code. This provision clearly delineates that preventive suspension may be imposed: (1) by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official; (2) by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official; and (3) by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official. This creates an exclusive grant of authority based on the level of the elective office involved.
The Court rejected the respondents’ justification based on Section 7 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, which they misconstrued as granting parallel authority. The Court held that implementing rules must conform to, and cannot amend, the law they implement. A proper reading of the rule, using the terms “as the case may be” and “respectively” in juxtaposition with Section 63 of the Code, confirms the same delineation: the Minister suspends provincial/city officials; the Governor suspends municipal officials. Since the petitioners are city officials, only the Minister of Local Government could order their preventive suspension.
Furthermore, the complaint was improperly filed with the Provincial Governor instead of the Minister as required by Section 61 of the Code. Consequently, all proceedings emanating from this jurisdictional defect, including the resolution, suspension order, and appointment of an OIC, were null and void. The petitioners’ refusal to participate in the hearings was therefore justified. The Court granted the petition, annulled the assailed orders, and made the temporary restraining order permanent.