G.R. No. L-23155. September 9, 1974.
RUFINO G. BARTULATA, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. MACARIO PERALTA, JR., ET AL., respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Petitioner Rufino G. Bartulata served in the Philippine Constabulary from 1924, attaining the rank of sergeant by 1941. Upon the USAFFE surrender order, he refused and joined the recognized guerrilla unit, the 108th Infantry, 10th Military District. Within this unit, he was promoted to third lieutenant and then to second lieutenant. His name and rank appeared in a 1946 Roster of Reserve Officers. After the war, he continued service in the postwar Philippine Army as a second lieutenant, receiving corresponding pay and allowances until his honorable discharge on January 31, 1947, still holding that rank. In 1956, he applied for retirement under Republic Act No. 340 . His application was approved, but he was retired with the rank of Staff Sergeant, not Second Lieutenant. The military authorities denied his requests for rank adjustment, contending his name was not in the approved reconstructed roster of his guerrilla unit, thus his guerrilla status was not conclusively recognized.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner Rufino G. Bartulata is entitled to be retired with the rank of second lieutenant and to receive corresponding pension differentials.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and granted the writ of mandamus. The legal logic centers on the effect of Executive Order No. 21 issued by President Sergio Osmeña on October 28, 1944. This order confirmed the temporary ranks of officers appointed or promoted in the field by commanders of recognized military forces, effective as of the date of such appointment or promotion. The 108th Infantry, to which Bartulata belonged, was a recognized guerrilla unit. His promotions within that unit were therefore confirmed by the executive order. The Court rejected the respondents’ argument that the order was not self-executing and that inclusion in a reconstructed roster was a mandatory precondition. It held that the executive order itself conferred the rank confirmation directly. Bartulata’s subsequent service in the postwar army, where he was paid and treated as a second lieutenant, and his honorable discharge under that rank, constituted official recognition and implementation of his status. The government’s prior acts, including granting him back pay as an officer, estopped it from denying his rank. Furthermore, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was inapplicable as the action was against a department secretary whose acts are considered acts of the President unless disapproved. Respondents were ordered to retire Bartulata as a second lieutenant and pay the corresponding pension differentials from his retirement date.