G.R. No. 84850 June 29, 1989
RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LEON GAW, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado, Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation, was convicted by the Regional Trial Court for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing a dishonored check. He was sentenced to imprisonment and a fine. After the decision was read, petitioner, through counsel, orally manifested his intention to appeal. The trial court ordered the records forwarded to the Court of Appeals, which then issued a notice for petitioner to file his Appellant’s Brief. Petitioner secured several extensions for filing this brief.
While finalizing his brief, petitioner sought new counsel and subsequently filed a “Petition for Probation” with the trial court, invoking Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended (the Probation Law). The trial court did not accept it, as the records were already with the appellate court. Petitioner then filed a “Manifestation and Petition for Probation” with the Court of Appeals, asking it to grant probation or remand the case to the trial court for that purpose. He also moved to hold the briefing period in abeyance. Later, he filed a “Manifestation and Motion” formally withdrawing his appeal, conditioned on the approval of his probation application.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner’s application for probation, filed after perfecting his appeal by notifying the trial court and after the records were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, but before filing his Appellant’s Brief, is barred under P.D. No. 968, as amended.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the application for probation is barred. The legal logic centers on the interpretation of Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended by P.D. No. 1257. The amended law explicitly states that an application for probation must be filed “after the trial court has convicted and sentenced the accused but before he begins to serve his sentence.” Crucially, it adds a new proviso: “No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.”
The Court held that petitioner perfected his appeal the moment he clearly expressed his intent to appeal to the trial court after the promulgation of the judgment, and the court ordered the elevation of the records. This act of perfecting the appeal occurred long before he filed his probation application. The law’s intent, as shown in the “Whereas” clauses of the amending decree, is to prevent accused persons from using an appeal as an interim tactic, delaying finality, and then opting for probation if the appeal fails. It aims to ensure probation is availed at the first opportunity, not after testing the waters of appeal. The fact that the Appellant’s Brief was not yet filed is irrelevant; the perfection of the appeal is the statutory cutoff point. Consequently, by perfecting his appeal, petitioner forfeited his right to apply for probation. The Court of Appeals correctly denied the petition, and its decision was affirmed.