G.R. No. L-63552 August 5, 1988
FRANCISCO TAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. PEDRO RAMIREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region of Manila, Branch XXX, and LORENZA DONGSAL, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Francisco Tan filed an ejectment complaint against private respondent Lorenza Dongsal in the Manila city court. During the trial, Dongsal appeared without counsel and requested a resetting, which Tan opposed. The judge suggested a settlement conference. Tan and his lawyer persuaded Dongsal to sign a compromise agreement requiring her to pay rental arrears of P2,020.00 and attorney’s fees of P800.00. The court approved the agreement after Dongsal affirmed she understood its terms, and she paid the accrued rentals that day.
On the date set for paying the attorney’s fees, Dongsal, now with her own counsel, waited for Tan to request an amendment to the agreement, but he did not appear. Dongsal later filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to set aside the execution, alleging jurisdictional defects and fraud in the compromise agreement’s execution. After receiving an execution order despite pending motions, she filed a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC denied Tan’s motion to dismiss the petition. Tan’s subsequent certiorari petition was denied by the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC).

ISSUE

The core issues are: (1) whether the IAC decision is invalid for being rendered by a division of only three members; (2) whether the petition for relief from judgment stated a valid cause of action; (3) whether certiorari was a proper remedy against the RTC’s interlocutory order; and (4) whether an ordinary appeal was the correct remedy.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. First, the IAC division’s composition was valid. Section 11 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 explicitly provides that three members constitute a quorum for a division, and the affirmative vote of three is necessary for a decision. The challenged decision met these requirements, as three members concurred. Second, the petition for relief sufficiently alleged a cause of action. Dongsal claimed she was unassisted by counsel and was inveigled into signing the compromise, constituting fraud and mistake—grounds for relief under Rule 38. The validity of these allegations is for the trial court to determine preliminarily, subject to appellate review.
Third, certiorari was an improper remedy. The RTC order denying the motion to dismiss was interlocutory. Certiorari cannot substitute for an ordinary appeal unless a grave abuse of discretion is shown. Tan’s mere allegation thereof, without proof, did not justify deviation from regular procedure. Any errors in the RTC proceedings should be raised on ordinary appeal after a final judgment. Finally, the Court noted that Tan’s voluminous pleadings contained irrelevant arguments, unnecessarily prolonging the case. Counsel are admonished to argue concisely, focusing only on pertinent issues to aid the speedy administration of justice.