G.R. No. L-55132 August 30, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, Judge, et al., respondents.

FACTS

An Information was filed charging private respondents with “Theft of Minerals” under Section 78 of P.D. No. 463, as amended. It alleged that from March 27, 1978, and continuing for several months, the respondents, conspiring and with intent of gain, extracted, removed, and disposed of sand, gravel, stones, and boulders from the Sumigar Quarry in Banawe, Ifugao. The quarry was covered by a valid commercial lease permit issued to Felix de Castro. The taking was done without his consent, without any permit from the Bureau of Mines, and involved the use of force and intimidation against the permittee’s laborers. The respondents moved to quash the Information, arguing the facts did not constitute an offense. They claimed their payment of a “sand and gravel tax” to the Municipal Treasurer constituted government consent, and they invoked LOI No. 243, which they argued allowed extraction for government infrastructure projects.
The prosecution opposed, contending the municipal tax receipts were not equivalent to the mining permit required by the Bureau of Mines, and that LOI No. 243 and its implementing rules granted extraction rights only to government entities, not to private persons. Respondent Judge granted the Motion to Quash, ruling that a violation of P.D. No. 463 was merely administrative and that the crime of theft under the Revised Penal Code was not committed due to an absence of malice, as the tax payments indicated government knowledge. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this certiorari petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute the offense of Theft of Minerals.

RULING

Yes, the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion. In a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the test is the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information, assuming them to be true. The elements of Theft of Minerals under Section 78 of P.D. No. 463 are: (1) the accused extracted, removed, and/or disposed of minerals; (2) the minerals belonged to the Government or were taken from a mining claim leased or owned by another; and (3) the accused did so without a mining lease, temporary permit, or any other permit granted by the Secretary or Director of Mines.
The Information clearly alleged all these elements: the respondents extracted sand and gravel; the minerals were taken from a quarry leased to Felix de Castro; and the acts were done without any permit from the Bureau of Mines. Therefore, on its face, the Information was sufficient. The respondent Judge erred by considering matters extrinsic to the Information, specifically the tax receipts, which pertain to the merits of the defense and should be threshed out during trial. These receipts for local taxes did not constitute the required mining permit from the Bureau of Mines. Furthermore, the judge’s rationale that the taking lacked malice because taxes were paid is misplaced. The offense punished by P.D. No. 463 is a crime defined by a special law where criminal intent is not an element; the act itself, irrespective of motive, constitutes the offense. Consequently, the Orders quashing the Information were annulled and set aside, and the criminal case was ordered reinstated.