G.R. No. L-32392 August 31, 1988
AUREA AGUILAR and LEOCADIO PRIAS, petitioners, vs. HON. RAMON BLANCO and LEOPOLDO LABYANG, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Aurea Aguilar and Leocadio Prias secured a favorable judgment from the Municipal Court of San Enrique, Iloilo, in an action for damages and injunction against respondent Leopoldo Labyang. The municipal court decision was dated June 26, 1963. Labyang filed a notice of appeal and an appeal bond on July 23, 1963. The petitioners moved to dismiss the appeal in the Court of First Instance, arguing the judgment was final due to a late appeal and the absence of a supersedeas bond. The lower court initially dismissed the appeal on December 14, 1963, finding it was filed out of time. Labyang then filed a “Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for Relief from Judgment,” claiming his counsel received the decision on July 5, 1963, and that postal delay caused his late filing. On March 21, 1964, Judge Perfecto Querubin lifted the dismissal and gave due course to the appeal. Years later, petitioners filed another motion to dismiss, which Judge Ramon Blanco denied. They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed, leading to this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance acquired jurisdiction over Labyang’s appeal from the municipal court’s decision.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling that the appeal was not perfected on time and thus the Court of First Instance never acquired jurisdiction. The reglementary period for perfecting an appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to comply renders the lower court’s judgment final and executory. The reckoning of the appeal period begins from counsel’s receipt of the decision, not the client’s. Here, whether counsel received the decision on July 2 or July 5, 1963, the appeal filed on July 23, 1963, was beyond the 15-day period. Consequently, the municipal court’s judgment became final. The Court of First Instance’s subsequent orders, including the one giving due course to the appeal, were issued without jurisdiction. A petition for relief was also filed out of time, as it was submitted more than sixty days after counsel learned of the judgment. The inefficiency of postal service in notifying the client is not a valid excuse, as the duty to perfect the appeal rests on counsel. Since the municipal court decision was final, the petitioners were entitled to a writ of execution as a matter of right. The Supreme Court set aside the appellate court’s decision, dismissed Labyang’s appeal, and reinstated the final and executory municipal court judgment.