G.R. No. L-31371. December 19, 1974
MARIA LIWANAG-REYES, et al., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, VICTOR S. REYES, and HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), respondents.

FACTS

Special Proceedings No. 62055 was initiated by respondent Victor S. Reyes for the settlement of his father Clemente G. Reyes’s estate. The probate court initially appointed Victor as special administrator. About three years later, petitioners Maria Liwanag-Reyes (the widow) and her children filed a petition for letters of administration. Victor opposed, claiming a legal preference for appointment as regular administrator. The probate court, however, issued an order dated March 19, 1968, terminating Victor’s appointment as special administrator and appointing Philippine Trust Company as the regular administrator.
Victor filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing the probate court disregarded the order of preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court without clear and positive reasons showing his unsuitability. The Court of Appeals, in a decision dated August 14, 1969, reversed the probate court’s order. Petitioners then filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the appellate court’s decision and enjoin its implementation.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court should grant the petition to set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision that appointed Victor S. Reyes as regular administrator.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The legal logic centers on the curative effect of a subsequent agreement and the propriety of the remedy sought. Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred: first, because the probate court’s termination of Victor’s special administration was a ministerial act under Rule 80 upon appointing a regular administrator, not a removable act reviewable by certiorari; and second, the appellate court exceeded its authority by appointing Victor as regular administrator in a certiorari proceeding challenging only his removal as special administrator.
However, the Court found an insurmountable obstacle to granting relief. After the Court of Appeals’ decision, the parties executed an “Agreement” wherein petitioners expressly agreed that Victor S. Reyes would be the regular administrator. This agreement, by the parties’ own consent, cured any potential procedural flaws or defects in the appellate court’s decision. The Court ruled that issues regarding any misapprehension in entering such an agreement cannot be raised in a certiorari proceeding before the Supreme Court. Since the parties’ conformity rendered the alleged infirmities in the decision moot or waived, the charge of grave abuse of discretion against the lower court for implementing the decision was without basis. Petitioners were not without future recourse, as they could still seek Victor’s removal for cause under the law if his administration later proved prejudicial to their interests.