G.R. No. L-33352 December 20, 1974
TEODORO E. LERMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCEPCION DIAZ, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Teodoro Lerma and private respondent Concepcion Diaz are spouses. Lerma filed a criminal complaint for adultery against Diaz in August 1969. Subsequently, in November 1969, Diaz filed a complaint for legal separation and/or separation of properties against Lerma in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, including a petition for support pendente lite for herself and their minor son. Lerma opposed the support, citing his pending adultery case against Diaz as a defense. The lower court, presided by Judge Leonor Luciano, granted Diaz’s application for monthly support pendente lite in orders dated December 24, 1969 and February 15, 1970.
Lerma filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals to annul these orders. The appellate court initially set aside the orders but, upon Diaz’s motion for reconsideration, reversed itself and dismissed Lerma’s petition in a resolution dated January 20, 1971. Lerma then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for review. During the pendency of this appeal, the lower court, upon Diaz’s motion, ordered Lerma to pay the accrued support. Lerma sought from the Supreme Court a preliminary injunction to restrain enforcement, which was initially denied but later a temporary restraining order was issued.

ISSUE

Whether a spouse, against whom a judgment of conviction for adultery (pending appeal) has been rendered, is entitled to support pendente lite in an action for legal separation filed by her against the innocent spouse.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner Lerma, setting aside the challenged orders and resolution. The legal logic centers on the interpretation of Rule 61, Section 5 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 61, Section 4), which governs support pendente lite. The provision requires the court to consider the “respective means” and “the provisional findings of the court as to the facts of the case” in granting such support.
The Court held that the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to properly apply this standard. A judgment of conviction for adultery against Diaz, rendered by the Court of First Instance and pending appeal, constitutes a sufficient “provisional finding” that she is the guilty spouse. Since legal separation cannot be claimed by a guilty spouse, an action filed by such a spouse—especially if potentially in bad faith to circumvent the defense of adultery against a support claim—should not be used as a mechanism to obtain support pendente lite.
The right to separate support from conjugal property under Article 292 of the Civil Code presupposes the claimant has a justifiable cause to live separately. A petition filed by a spouse guilty of an act constituting a ground for legal separation (like adultery) negates this justification. This is reinforced by Civil Code provisions where the obligation to give support ceases if the recipient has committed an act warranting disinheritance (Article 303), and adultery is a cause for disinheriting a spouse (Article 921). The loss of the substantive right to support is incompatible with a provisional award. The Court emphasized this ruling is not a prejudgment of the main legal separation case but an application of the specific rules on provisional support.